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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of the Court is conferred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) 
(2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court incorrectly relied on appellee John Lehmer's 
ratification defense to dismiss appellant Scott Ockey's quiet title and declaratory 
judgment claims on cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court's 
summary judgment rulings are reviewed for correctness. Arnold Indus., Inc., v. 
Love, 2002 UT 133, Ifl 1, 63 P.3d 721. (Preserved at R. 2311 and 2662) 
2. Whether Ockey was entitled to summary judgment establishing as 
conversion Iron Mountain Alliance, Inc.'s ("IMAI") conduct in canceling Ockey's 
stock. The trial court's summary judgment rulings are reviewed for correctness. 
Arnold Indus., Inc., v. Love, 2002 UT 133, ^[11, 63 P.3d 721. (Preserved at R. 
2956) 
3. Whether the trial court misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-630 
(1992) in concluding Ockey had no preemptive rights in IMAI shares issued for 
services. The conclusion is a statutory interpretation made in response to a 
summary judgment motion and is reviewed for correctness. Bearden v. Croft, 
2001 UT 76, t 5, 31 P.3d 537 (Preserved at R. 4204) 
4. Did Ockey's acceptance of benefits he was entitled to receive under any 
circumstance amount to ratification of Lehmer's and IMAI's conduct barring 
Ockey's conversion claim? "Underlying empirical facts..." are reviewed under the 
1 
clear error standard, while the trial court's conclusion that the facts satisfy the 
ratification doctrine is reviewed for correctness. Drake v. Industrial Commission 
of Utah, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997). (Preserved at R. 2662 and 4604-05) 
5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting Lehmer's motion 
in limine to allow hearsay statements allegedly made by Nick Condas. The 
decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Jensen 
v. Intermountain Power, 1999 UT 10, f 12, 977 P.2d 474. (Preserved at R. 4220) 
6. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's finding that 
Ockey knew or had reason to know of the events giving rise to his conversion 
claim within the three years after the conversion. The trial court's factual findings 
are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
52(a). (Preserved at TT 641-57) 
7. Did the evidence of concealment and other wrongdoing justify 
application of the discovery rule to toll the conversion statute of limitations? The 
applicability of the discovery rule is a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742 (Utah 2002). To the extent application of the rule 
involves subsidiary factual determinations, the determinations are reviewed under 
the clearly erroneous standard. Id. (Preserved at TT 641-57) 
8. The trial court agreed Ockey had no adequate remedy at law for 
Lehmer's breach of fiduciary duty and conversion. Did the trial court then err in 
concluding it could not fashion an equitable remedy and, on that basis, dismiss the 
claims for lack of a remedy? The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed for 
2 
correctness. Drake v Industrial Commission of Utah, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997). 
(Preserved at TT 1001-05, 1020, 1041-49) 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-24 (1961) governs Ockey's entitlement to 
preemptive rights in shares issued by IMAI. Statute reads: "A shareholder shall 
have pre-emptive rights to acquire unissued shares of a corporation except as 
limited or denied in the Articles of Incorporation." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings. 
Scott Ockey and Cathy Condas initiated this case in June 1997, asserting 
claims against several defendants based primarily on two series of events.1 The 
first concerns efforts to divest plaintiffs of their undivided interests in a large piece 
of real property in Summit County, Utah known as the Condas Family Ranch (the 
"Ranch"). The second concerns the efforts of certain defendants to deprive 
plaintiffs of their interests in Iron Mountain Alliance, Inc., ("IMAI"), one of the 
entities formed to develop portions of the Ranch. 
Ockey's declaratory relief claim sought a determination that certain trusts 
established for his benefit had terminated and the trust property (undivided 
interests in the Ranch) had vested in him, rendering void any later attempts to 
convey the property. (R. 2641) Ockey also asserted a quiet title claim based on his 
interests in the Ranch. (R. 2643) He stated a claim against Lehmer for breach of 
Plaintiff Cathy Condas is not participating in this appeal. 
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fiduciary duty based on Lehmer's role as Ockey's attorney-in-fact, among other 
functions. (R. 2644) Finally, he stated a conversion claim against Lehmer and 
IMAI based on the cancellation of his stock in the company. The remaining 
claims were dismissed voluntarily and are not at issue here. 
On November 27, 2000, Ockey moved for partial summary judgment on his 
declaratory judgment and quiet title claims, asking the trial court to conclude his 
trusts had terminated as a matter of law, the trust property had vested in him at 
termination and that any efforts by the trustees to transfer the trust property 
following termination were void. (R. 2314) Lehmer opposed the motion and 
renewed his own motion for partial summary judgment aimed at the same claims. 
(R. 2399) Lehmer's arguments were based primarily on his ratification theory. On 
February 2, 2001, the court denied Ockey's motion without prejudice. (R. 3578) 
On February 15, 2001, the court effectively denied Ockey's motion with prejudice 
by granting Lehmer's. (R. 3747)3 
On January 10, 2001, Ockey filed a motion for partial summary judgment 
on his conversion claim. (R. 2959) The motion addressed two issues: Ockey's 
preemptive rights and whether the act of canceling Ockey's stock amounted to 
conversion as a matter of law. On November 5, 2001, the court concluded 
2
 A copy of the court's February 2, 2001 Order is included in the Addendum. 
3
 A copy of the court's February 15, 2001 Order is included in the Addendum. 
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material fact issues barred summary judgment on the conversion issue and denied 
that part of the motion. (R. 3956 and 4525)4 
The court granted the portion of Ockey's motion addressing the preemptive 
rights issue. (R. 4525) Lehmer moved the court to reconsider its ruling and on 
February 8, 2002, the court granted the motion. (R. 4548)5 
On January 4, 2002, Lehmer filed a motion in limine for the admission of 
evidence regarding statements allegedly made by the late Nick Condas. (R. 4294) 
Ockey filed his opposing memorandum on January 11, 2002.6 The trial court 
granted the motion and several trial witnesses were allowed to offer testimony 
regarding the alleged statements.7 
The parties tried the case to an advisory jury beginning January 16 and 
ending January 24, 2002. Because of settlements and voluntary dismissals, the 
only defendants remaining at the time of trial were Lehmer and IMAI. The 
remaining causes of action were the breach of fiduciary duty claim against Lehmer 
and the conversion claim against both defendants. (R. 4591) 
At the end of trial, the court granted Lehmer's motion for directed verdict 
on the theory that Ockey "had no remedy against Lehmer because [his] elected 
4
 A copy of the court's November 5, 2001 Order is included in the Addendum. 
The court again addressed its ruling in an Order entered January 22, 2002. (R. 
4525) A copy of that Order is also included in the Addendum. 
5
 A copy of the court's February 8, 2002 Order is included in the Addendum. 
6
 Ockey's "Memorandum in Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Nick Condas's 
Statements" was filed on January 11, 2002, according to the trial court's docket. A 
copy of the relevant page from the docket is included in the Addendum. For 
unknown reasons, the memorandum does not otherwise appear in the record. 
No written order granting the motion appears in the record. 
5 
equitable remedy - return of the allegedly converted stock ~ was merely damages 
in the guise of equity ..." and the court "could determine no other equitable remedy 
that c6uld be enforced against Lehmer." (R. 4592) 
The court issued its Ruling dismissing the conversion claim against IMAI 
on October 15, 2002, (R. 4555) and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law on April 22, 2003. (R. 4590)8 
B. Statement of Facts 
The Ranch consists of 2,700 acres of property in Summit County, Utah, 
originally homesteaded by John G. Condas in approximately 1926. When he died 
in 1969, John G. Condas left the Ranch in equal undivided shares to each of his six 
children: George Condas, Mary Lehmer, Nick Condas, Ellen Bayas, Alexandra 
Ockey and Chris Condas. (R. 728-29) 
In December of 1976, the six children conveyed their interests in the Ranch 
to separate irrevocable trusts established for the benefit of the next generation of 
the Condas family, including Ockey. On December 29, 1976, Alexandra Ockey 
established the Scott John Ockey Trust (sometimes referred to as "Scott Ockey 
Trust #1") and irrevocably conveyed to the trust an undivided one-twelfth (8.33%) 
interest in the Ranch. The trust agreement designates Nick Condas as trustee and 
Ockey as sole beneficiary. (R. 219)9 
A copy of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is included in the 
Addendum. 
9
 A copy of the trust agreement is included in the Addendum. 
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On the same day, using a substantially identical form of trust agreement, 
Nick Condas established a similar irrevocable trust, also known as the Scott John 
Ockey Trust (sometimes referred to as "Scott Ockey Trust #2"), into which he 
conveyed an undivided one-eighteenth (5.55%) interest in the Ranch. (R. 232)10 
The trust agreement designates Mary Lehmer as trustee and Ockey as sole 
beneficiary. Between his two trusts (together referred to as the "Trusts"), Ockey 
became the beneficial owner of an undivided five-thirty-sixth (approximately 
13.89%) interest in the Ranch. (R. 731) 
Paragraph 2b of both trust agreements provides: "As each primary 
beneficiary attains the age of 21 years, this trust shall terminate as to such 
beneficiary, and the entire trust property then remaining shall be paid over and 
distributed to him or her, free and discharged of all trust." (R. 219 and 233) 
Paragraph 2c of both trust agreements provides Ockey the option of extending the 
term of the Trusts until his 28 birthday, when the Trusts were to automatically 
terminate and "the entire trust property then remaining . . . paid over and 
distributed to him .. . free and discharged of all trust." (R. 220 and 233) 
Ockey turned 21 in 1979. (R. 2346) He never extended the term of the 
Scott Ockey Trust #1. At his Aunt Mary's suggestion, Ockey signed a letter 
drafted by Mary requesting that she continue managing the Scott Ockey Trust #2 
following his 21st birthday. (R. 2349) Ockey was never informed of the nature of 
his Trusts, and was never shown the trust documents. (R. 2346) Ockey turned 28 
10
 A copy of the trust agreement is included in the Addendum. 
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on September 6, 1986. (R. 2346) Neither trustee ever conveyed to Ockey his 
interests in the Ranch. 
Although he did not know at the time, by the end of 1986 Ockeyfs trusts 
had terminated and title to his 13.89% interest in the Ranch had vested in him. 
Three years later, Lehmer and other family members arranged to lease the Ranch 
to the Iron Mountain Resort Company for approximately $30,000.00 per year.11 
In 1992, Iron Mountain Resort Company changed the name and nature of 
its business organization to Iron Mountain Alliance Incorporated ("IMAI"). At the 
time, IMAI owed the Condas family members about $76,000 under the lease. 
IMAI's owners, Gerald Jackson and Hank Rothwell, agreed to sign a note and 
pledge their stock in the company as collateral for the debt. (R. 2979 and 2985-91) 
Under the agreement, if IMAI failed to pay the note, Lehmer, acting for the 
family, could elect to receive a transfer of the stock in full satisfaction for IMAI's 
obligations under the note. (R. 2985-86) Ockey knew nothing of the agreement. 
One year later, IMAI failed to pay the debt and Lehmer notified the 
company that "the family" had elected to receive the pledged IMAI stock. (R. 
2985-91 and 2993) On June 30, 1993, Lehmer took delivery of the stock as a 
"means of transferring the ownership of [IMAI] to the various members of the 
Condas Family." (R. 2995) The next day, instead of transferring ownership of 
11
 A copy of the "Option to Ground Lease and Ground Lease" dated May 1, 1989 
is found at R. 3251. 
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IMAI as he had promised, Lehmer canceled all the existing shares without 
authority, stating: 
The stock certificates obtained from Iron Mountain Alliance, Inc. 
...are herewith delivered and transferred to the Company for 
cancellation. 
Id. At the same time that he canceled the shares, Lehmer installed himself, Nick 
Condas and John Condas as the new board of directors and the executive officers 
of IMAI. The three of them then issued stock to themselves, and defendants Alex 
Ockey, George Condas and Ellen Bayas. (R. 2997-3000) 
The net result of this conduct was to divest Ockey of his ownership interest 
in IMAI and redistribute that interest among Lehmer, Nick, John Condas, 
Alexandra Ockey and her brother and sister. Alexandra Ockey subsequently 
admitted this fact in a written memorandum in which she conceded: 
[T]he IMA Corp. stock should have been split among the legal 
owners of record. Instead, it was arranged that the stock be 
distributed to the real parties in interest (the brothers and sisters), not 
the straw man owners of the land (the children). 
(R. 2973) Eventually, IMAI issued over 100,000 shares of stock to various family 
members other than Ockey. Initially, the stock was sold for cash. Later, the 
stockholders issued shares to themselves in exchange for services supposedly 
benefiting the overall ranch development effort. (R. 2982-83 and 3002-09) 
Ockey filed suit after discovering the conversion of his stock and the terms 
of this Trusts. In the meantime, his interests in the Ranch had been conveyed to a 
family limited liability company which had, in turn, conveyed those interests to 
9 
the entity which would eventually develop the Ranch into a high end residential 
subdivision. (R. 836-43) Ockey's claims pertaining to his Ranch interests 
threatened further development. At the developer's urging, Ockey executed a 
Settlement Agreement with the developer which allowed Ockey to continue 
pursuing title to his Ranch interests and gave the developer the right to purchase 
those interests if Ockey succeeded in this litigation. (R. 1157)12 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court decided more than two dozen dispositive motions during the 
four and a half year tenure of this case. Ockey appeals three of those decisions. 
The first concerns a straightforward legal issue. Title to the assets held in Ockey's 
Trusts — undivided interests in the Ranch — vested in Ockey not later than his 28th 
birthday. Attempts by Ockey's "trustees" to convey his interests eight years later 
were void. The trial court denied Ockey's motion on the issue and granted a cross 
motion filed by Lehmer based on its conclusion that Ockey ratified the trustees' 
conveyances. Ratification was not possible as a matter of law since the trustees' 
conduct was void, not merely voidable. 
The second summary judgment motion concerned Ockey's conversion 
claim. Initially, the trial court denied the motion based on perceived issues of fact. 
Following trial, the court dismissed the claim based on defendants' ratification 
theory. No material fact was at issue and the court's ratification conclusion 
ignored Utah law. Among other missing claim elements, no one suggested that 
12
 A copy of the Settlement Agreement is included in the Addendum. 
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cancellation of the stock was done on behalf of Ockey. Moreover, Ockey's never 
"affirmed" the conversion in the manner required by law. 
Ockey also moved for summary judgment on the question of entitlement to 
preemptive rights in IMAI stock. IMAI argued that even if Ockey had received 
his converted shares, he had no preemptive rights in shares issued for services. 
The trial court originally granted Ockey's motion, then reconsidered and 
concluded Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-630(2)(c)(1992) applied to limit Ockey's 
preemptive rights. The trial court's reliance on section 16-10a-630(2)(c) was 
misplaced because the statute was enacted after IMAI adopted its Amended 
Articles of Incorporation allowing for unlimited preemptive rights. 
Just before trial, Lehmer moved in limine to allow testimony regarding 
statements allegedly made by the late Nick Condas. The statements are hearsay 
and the court's decision to allow the testimony regarding the statements was error. 
Following trial, the court found that Ockey either knew or had reason to 
know of the events giving rise to his conversion claim within the three-year statute 
of limitations for conversion. The evidence does not support the court's finding. 
At best, the evidence in support of the finding was circumstantial and was 
contradicted by the clear weight of the direct evidence. 
The concealment version of the equitable discovery rule should have 
applied to toll the conversion statute of limitations. Ockey did not learn of the 
conversion because of the manner in which Lehmer and IMAI concealed it. 
11 
Moreover, under the circumstances, there was nothing unreasonable about Ockey's 
failure to learn of the conversion within three years. 
Finally, the trial court's decision that it could not fashion an equitable 
remedy for Lehmer's breach of fiduciary duty and conversion is contrary to Utah 
law. The court could have restored Ockey's ownership interest in IMAI by 
ordering Lehmer to convey a portion of the ownership interest he held in the 
company. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY RELIED ON RATIFICATION 
TO DISMISS OCKEY'S QUIET TITLE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 
CLAIMS. 
Ockey's November 2000 partial summary judgment motion had a narrow 
focus. It sought only the trial court's ruling that the property interests held in 
Ockey's Trusts fully vested in him no later than his 28th birthday in 1986, and that 
the 1994 attempt by his "trustees" to convey the property interests was void ab 
initio. The facts supporting the motion were undisputed and Ockey was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
The trial court's contrary conclusion was based on a ratification theory 
advanced by Lehmer in a cross motion for summary judgment. Lehmer argued 
that the trustee's 1994 attempts to convey Ockey's property interests were not void 
but merely voidable and that Ockey ratified the conveyances when he signed 
documents purportedly supporting the conveyances. The legal and factual issues 
12 
surrounding Lehmer's motion are addressed in subpoint B. The issues surrounding 
Ockey's motion are addressed in the following subpoint. 
A. The Property Interests Held in the Trusts Vested in Ockey in 1986. 
By operation of law, Ockey acquired equitable title to his undivided 
interests in the Ranch when the Trusts were created. See In re Malualani B. 
Hoopiiaina Trusts, 2005 UT App 272, [^15, 118 P.3d 861 (recognizing 
beneficiaries acquire equitable title to trust assets if the trust "provides no means 
for the trustees to take or transfer ... [the] assets from the beneficiaries without 
their consent....") When the Trusts terminated, the remaining estate of the trustees 
also terminated, leaving Ockey with both equitable and legal title to his Ranch 
interests. See 90 CIS. Trusts § 126 (2006) ("On the termination of a trust, the 
estate of the trustee ceases, and the legal, as well as the equitable, title vests in the 
beneficial owner."). 
Legal title vested in Ockey not later than his 28 birthday pursuant to the 
Statute of Uses: 
By operation of the Statute of Uses, when the terms of the trusts 
were fulfilled so that the trustees' (or trustee's) only duties were to 
deliver the trust property to the beneficiaries, the Plaintiffs were 
vested with legal title to the properties. See 27 Henry 8, c. 10 (1535 
Eng.); see also Garth v. Cotton, Eng. Rep. 392 (Ch. 1753) 
(recognizing "jus in rem" and jus "ad rem"); Henderson v. Adams, 
15 Utah 30, 48 P. 398, 401 (1897) (stating that the rule of the Statute 
of Uses "is part of the common law of this state."). 
In re Malualani B. Hoopiiaina Trusts, 2005 UT App 272 at p 3 , n. 3 (Jackson, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Hoopiiaina involved trust property which 
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was supposed to be distributed to plaintiffs on death of a trustee and the 21 
birthday of one beneficiary. Judge Jackson explained: 
Once Nolan turned twenty-one and the Hartmans died, the trust 
became passive, the Statute of Uses took effect, and the Plaintiffs 
became seised with ... both the legal and equitable title in the 
property.... 
Id. See also Restatement (Second) Trust § 345, comment a. 
A similar situation was addressed in Sorrell v. Sorrell, 1 S.W. 3d 867 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1999). Real property was placed in trust and three siblings were named 
as the beneficiaries. Termination of the trust was tied to death of the beneficiaries' 
mother. As happened here, however, on termination the trustee failed to distribute 
the trust property. Instead, he continued to manage the trust for a number of years 
and even partitioned the trust property. When the beneficiaries became aware of 
this situation, they challenged the trustee's authority to act. 
In the process of unwinding the trustee's actions, the Sorrell court 
concluded that the trust had terminated immediately upon the mother's death and 
that the trust property had vested in the beneficiaries upon termination: 
On termination of a trust, the estate of the trustee ceases, and the 
legal, as well as the equitable, title vests in the beneficial owner 
without the necessity of any act or intervention on the part of the 
trustee, unless the intention of the creator appears that the legal title 
should continue in the trustee. 
Id at 870. 
In this case, the grantors of the Trusts expressed no intent that the trustees 
retain legal title after termination. Consequently, as was the case in Sorrell, once 
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the Trusts terminated, legal and equitable title vested in Ockey and the trustees had 
nothing to convey eight years later. 
The law would compel the same result even if title had not vested in Ockey. 
Upon termination, a trustee only has such powers and duties as are appropriate for 
winding up the trust: 
The termination of a trust leaves the trustee with a mere 
administrative title to the fund . . . . At the time of termination, the 
trustee is not immediately divested of all duties and responsibilities, 
but he has powers and duties appropriate for winding up trust affairs. 
The trustees' authority to act is limited by the terms of the trust. 
90 C. J.S. Trusts § 126 (2006); See also Restatement of (Second) Trusts §344; 
Bogert, Trusts and Trustees §1010 (2d ed. rev,1983)("[A]ceording to the weight of 
authority the duty of the trustee to make payments or distributions .. .to the proper 
party, at the prescribed time, and in the required medium, is absolute....")s 
Here, winding up the trusts should have been particularly simple since the 
only asset was an undivided interest in the Ranch property. Done properly, 
winding up involved nothing more than executing deeds formally conveying the 
property to Ockey. Any other action by the trustees necessarily exceeded their 
authority and was void ab initio. See Sorrell, 1 S.W. 3d at 871 ("[T]he trustees 
were acting outside their authority in attempting to convey trust property... [and] 
the trial court was correct in holding that conveyance void.") 
This conclusion should have compelled the trial court to grant summary 
judgment quieting title in Ockey. The court's decision to avoid the conclusion in 
deference to Lehmer's ratification argument was erroneous. 
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B. Ockey Never Ratified the Trustees1 Attempted Conveyance. 
1. Introduction 
The core of Lehmer's argument is that by settling with the developers, 
Ockey "ratified" or affirmed conduct which, but for the settlement, was voidable. 
Of course, if the "ratified" conduct was void and not merely voidable, ratification 
was not possible as a matter of law. See Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling 
Platter, Inc., 930 P.?d 268, 273, n. 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (noting that "void" 
contracts are "incapable of confirmation or ratification."); 2A C.J.S. Agency § 56 
(2006) ("[W]here an act done by one person in behalf of another without authority 
is illegal and void, such an act cannot be ratified...."). 
By concluding Ockey ratified the conveyances, the trial court necessarily 
and incorrectly concluded that the conveyances were not void.13 Even assuming 
the conveyances were merely voidable, Lehmer's motion should have been denied 
because the conveyances were never ratified. 
2. The Trustees' Conveyances Were Not Ratified. 
Lehmer argued that Ockey ratified the trustees' conveyances by settling 
with the developers. The argument is that when Ockey agreed to convey his 
interests to the developers regardless of the outcome of this case, Ockey gave up 
his ability to challenge the trustees' conveyances. 
The factual premise for the argument is accurate: as a part of the settlement, 
Ockey did agree to sell his interests to the developers after successfully 
13
 A copy of the trial court's Order is found at R. 3747. 
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challenging the trustees' conveyances. But the "ratification" conclusion does not 
follow. In agreeing to sell the interests he seeks to retrieve in this case, Ockey 
expressly reserved both his right to retrieve his interests and his right to pursue 
damage claims. Under the heading "Continuation of Litigation," section 4 of the 
Settlement Agreement expressly provides that "the Litigation shall be permitted to 
go forward." (R. 1161)14 The term "Litigation" is defined in section 1.13 to 
include the claims stated in Ockey's Second Amended Complaint. (R. 1159) The 
Settlement Agreement specifically contemplates the possibility that those claims 
will lead to a recognition or vesting of title in Ockey, a result defined in section 
1.6 of the agreement as a "Favorable Title Judgment." Id. 
Lehmer's focus on the eventual impact of the Settlement Agreement 
ignored the importance of its terms. By expressly retaining his claims against 
Lehmer and the other defendants, Ockey did precisely the opposite of 
"ratification." He reaffirmed his intent to continue pursuing the claims he was 
pursuing before he settled with the developers, including his claims attacking the 
purported conveyances by the trustees. Given its terms, the impact of the 
Settlement Agreement did nothing to advance the Lehmer's ratification theory. 
3. No "Prior Acts" Were Affirmed. 
Lehmer's argument was also defeated by the basic definition of 
"ratification." Ratification requires "affirmance by a person of a prior act which 
did not bind him. . . ." Riss v. Angel, 934 P.2d 669, 683 (Wash. 1997) (citing, 
A copy of the Settlement Agreement is in the Addendum. 
17 
inter alia, Restatement (Second) of Agency §82 (1958)). The "prior act" that 
Lehmer claims was "affirmed" by the Settlement Agreement is the conveyance of 
Ockey's property interests by his "trustees." But in no sense does the Settlement 
Agreement affirm the conveyance.15 In essence, the Settlement Agreement 
provides that Ockey will continue the litigation and attack the purported 
conveyance in an effort to quiet his title. The Settlement Agreement does not 
affirm any "prior act." By definition, then, there was no ratification. 
4. Questions of Fact Exist Concerning the Ratification Argument. 
Mr. Lehmer's ratification argument depended on a finding that Ockey had 
"intent to ratify." Zions First National Bank v. Clark Clinic Corporation, 762 
P.2d 1090, 1098 (Utah 1988). Intent to affirm a transaction sufficient to give rise 
to a ratification may be either express or implied. Ratification by implication 
requires "unequivocal conduct giving rise to an inference that [the principal] 
intended his conduct to amount to a ratification." Campbell v. Stagg, 596 P.2d 
1037, 1040 (Utah 1979). Whether particular acts or omissions amount to 
unequivocal conduct demonstrating intent to affirm is generally a question of fact. 
See, e.g., Daniels Ins. Inc. v. Daon Corp., 742 P.2d 540 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987); Sea 
Lion Corp. v. Air Logistics of Alaska, Inc., 787 P.2d 109 (Alaska 1990). 
In this case, Ockey's decision to settle with the developers on the terms of 
the Settlement Agreement is not the kind of unequivocal conduct supporting a 
conclusion that Ockey intended to ratify the conveyance of his interests. Nothing 
15
 A copy of the Settlement Agreement is found at R. 2441. 
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in the agreement supports the conclusion. The trial court's contrary decision was 
based on an incorrect interpretation of the law on ratification. 
II. OCKEY WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS 
CONVERSION CLAIM. 
Ockey's summary judgment motion on his conversion claim asked the trial 
court to rule as a matter of law that he owned a 13.89% of the IMAI stock on June 
30, 19935 that cancellation of the stock 24 hours later constitutes conversion, and 
that he had preemptive rights in connection with all shares issued by the 
corporation, not just those issued for cash as claimed by IMAI. 
The trial court denied the motion as it pertained to conversion, ruling only 
that "there are disputed issues of material fact." (R. 3956) The court granted the 
motion as to the preemptive rights issue, concluding as a matter of law that 
"shareholders of Iron Mountain Alliance, Inc.... possessed preemptive rights to 
stock issued for services rendered even after the July 1, 1992 enactment of the 
Utah Revised Business Corporation Act." (R. 4549) 
Defendants moved for reconsideration of the preemptive rights ruling. 
After additional briefing, the court reversed itself, concluding "Utah Code Ann. 
§16-10a-630(2)(c) limited the scope of preemptive rights of IMAI shareholders 
upon its enactment on July 1, 1992...." (R. 4549) 
A. Cancellation of the Stock Constitutes Conversion 
This Court long ago "recognized that a shareholder whose stock is 
wrongfully canceled may choose to bring an action for conversion or may ;insist[] 
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on his rights under his contract of membership in the corporation, and the 
privileges, present and future, to which he is entitled by virtue of membership.'" 
Baggett v. Cyclopss Medical Systems, Inc., 935 P.2d 1265, 1268 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997), quoting West v. Tintic Standard Mining Co., 263 P. 490, 495 (Utah 1928). 
Ockey chose to bring an action for conversion of his wrongfully canceled stock. 
Conversion requires "intent to exercise dominion or control over goods 
inconsistent with the owner's rights." Allredv. Hinkley, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (Utah 
1958). The facts supporting IMAI's exercise of dominion over the stock in a 
manner inconsistent with Ockey's ownership rights were undisputed. The family 
members appointed Lehmer the "lessors' representative" to deal with those leasing 
the ranch property. Lehmer conceded that Ockey was one of the "lessors" he was 
representing. He was among "the members of the family that owned [an] interest 
in the property" when they leased it to IMAI. (R. 2979) I6 
The IMAI stock was pledged by its original owners to secure a debt owed 
to the lessors/family members. When the original stockholders could not pay the 
debt, the stock was delivered to Lehmer as lessors' representative to satisfy the 
debt. Rather than distribute it to its owners, however, he decided to vote the 
shares to elect himself, John Condas and Nick Condas as the new directors and 
officers of IMAI. He then surrendered the stock to the company which 
16
 Lehmer's acknowledgment of Ockey's interest as an owner is consistent with the 
letter he received from Tom Clyde, counsel for the lessees, concerning the fact 
that the corpus of Ockey's Trusts should have been distributed to him years before 
Lehmer adopted the role of lessors' representative. (R. 3011-3013) 
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immediately canceled the stock and began issuing new shares to select family 
members for cash and services. The act of canceling the stock was wrongful, 
constituting conversion as a matter of law. See Baggett, 935 P.2d at 1268. 
The trial court did not reach the legal issue posed by Ockey's motion. 
Instead, it concluded fact issues existed, apparently because of IMAFs claim that 
Ockey and all other family members agreed to relinquish their IMAI stock. The 
claim was based on affidavits from John Lehmer and John Condas referring to 
statements on the subject purportedly made by Nick Condas. Ockey moved to 
strike the affidavits. (R. 3620 and 3628) The trial court never ruled on the 
motions but apparently decided the affidavits raised fact issues. 
The portions of the affidavit testimony referring to the statements should 
have been stricken. The testimony was inadmissible and, therefore, not competent 
to create an issue of fact. Even if admissible, the testimony did not support 
IMAFs claim - it did not state Ockey agreed to relinquish his stock. 
Consequently, it did nothing to refute Ockey's affidavit testimony and therefore 
did not create a genuine issue of fact. 
No fact issues existed and Ockey was entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law. Absent Ockey's consent or a court order, IMAI simply had no basis 
for canceling Ockey's shares. Lehmer took delivery of the stock as a "means of 
transferring the ownership of [IMAI] to the various members of the Condas 
Family...," including Ockey. (R. 2995) When IMAI canceled Ockey's share of 
that ownership, it was guilty of conversion as a matter of law. See Baggett, 935 
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P.2d at 1268; See also William M. Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of 
Private Corporations § 5166 (2005) ("If the corporation wrongfully cancels a 
certificate and refuses to recognize the owner as a shareholder, it is guilty of a 
conversion of the shares... [and] may be compelled to issue a new certificate."). 
B. Ockey Had Preemptive Rights in All Issued IMAI Stock. 
IMAI argued that even if Ockey had received his converted shares and 
exercised all available preemptive rights, Ockey's interest in the company would 
have been legitimately diluted down to 5.95%. The argument was based on Utah 
Code Ann. §16-10a-630(2)(c)(1992), which reads: 
(c) There is no preemptive right with respect to: 
(i) shares issued as compensation for services to 
directors, officers, agents, or employees of the 
corporation . . .; 
(iv) shares sold otherwise than for cash. 
IMAI claimed most of the stock was issued "otherwise than for cash" and, 
therefore, Ockey had no right to maintain his 13.89% stake in the company. 
IMAFs reliance on section 16~10a-630 is misplaced because the statute was 
enacted effective July 1, 1992, three months after IMAI adopted its Amended 
Articles of Incorporation allowing for unlimited preemptive rights. Section 7 of 
IMAFs March 1992 Amended Articles of Incorporation reads: 
7. Preemptive Rights. Shareholders will have preemptive rights in 
the corporation as provided by law in the event that any additional 
shares are authorized and issued, so that their relative ownership of 
the corporation's shares remain unchanged if the shareholder 
exercises his or her preemptive rights. This shall specifically 
require the corporation to extend the offer to purchase additional 
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shares to the shareholders of each class of stock, so they may 
preserve their percentage interest in the corporation as a whole .... 
(R. 3017-3020) (emphasis added) All oflMATs stock was issued under the 
preemptive rights language of Section 7. The language was adopted at a time 
when the operative statute was Utah Code Ann. §16-10-24 (1961), which reads: 
A shareholder shall have pre-emptive rights to acquire unissued 
shares of a corporation except as limited or denied in the Articles of 
Incorporation. 
The Utah Revised Business Corporation Act (the "Revised Act") repealed 
and replaced the former act. But in replacing the former act, the legislature gave 
no indication that it intended retroactive application. On the contrary, the 
legislature included a savings provision in the Revised Act. Utah Code Ann. §16-
10l-1704(l)(b) states: 
[T]he repeal of any statute by this act does not affect: 
(b) any ratification, right, remedy, privilege, obligation 
or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the 
statute before its repeal... . 
In other words, the preemptive rights Ockey enjoyed under the March 1992 
Amended Articles of Incorporation and the corresponding statutory provision were 
not repealed by the limiting language in the Revised Act. 
Even if the legislature intended retroactive application for the Revised Act, 
the result is the same. The language of section 16-10a-630 preceding the 
limitation language makes clear that corporations may control preemptive rights 
by express provision in articles of incorporation. Section 16-10a-630(2) states: 
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(2) A statement included in the articles of incorporation that "the 
corporation elects to have preemptive rights," or words of similar 
import, means that the following principles apply except to the 
extent the articles of incorporation expressly provided otherwise 
(Emphasis added) One of the "principles" which applies "except to the extent the 
articles expressly provide otherwise . . . " is the limitation on preemptive rights 
with respect to shares "sold otherwise than for cash." Id. As noted, the articles for 
IMAI expressly provide for unlimited preemptive rights. 
The language of Section 7 is clear and could not more directly express an 
intent to allow shareholders unlimited preemptive rights. Accordingly, the 
limiting language of §16-10a-630(2)(c) is inapplicable even if it could legitimately 
be given retroactive effect. The trial court's contrary conclusion was erroneous. 
As it originally ruled, Ockey's preemptive rights in IMAI stock extended to shares 
issued for both cash and services. 
III. OCKEY NEVER RATIFIED THE CONVERSION OF HIS STOCK 
Following trial, the court concluded that by "accepting the benefits of 
development of the Ranch with prior knowledge of the development process, the 
ownership of the Ranch and the IMAI stock ...," Ockey "ratified any conversion of 
the IMAI stock." (R. 4605) The court never explained the legal basis for the 
conclusion. 
The conversion at issue is the wrongful cancellation of Ockey's stock. To 
establish ratification of the conversion, defendants had to prove each of the five 
elements of ratification: (1) an act done or purported to be done on behalf of a 
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principal, (2) by a person purporting to act as his agent, (3) without valid 
authorization, (4) where the principal later affirms the act, (5) with full knowledge 
of all the facts surrounding the act. See Restatement (Second) of Agency §82 
(1958). There is no evidence in the record establishing any of the elements. 
In particular, defendants did not even suggest that cancellation of the stock 
was done on behalf of Ockey. And neither Lehmer nor IMAI was purporting to 
act as Ockey's agent in canceling the stock. Given the lack of agency, the "valid 
authorization" element is inapplicable. 
The final two elements require explanation. As the trial court noted, Ockey 
has accepted benefits from development of the Ranch with knowledge of the 
conversion. Under the circumstances, however, accepting the benefits does not 
amount to affirming the conversion, as required by the fourth ratification element. 
The court's unexamined underlying assumption is that cancellation of the 
stock made possible at least some measurable portion of the benefits derived from 
development. The problem with the assumption is that it finds no support in the 
record. Canceling Ockey's stock did nothing to benefit Ockey. The benefits 
Ockey has received derive solely from his membership in IMHG, the limited 
liability company that contributed the Ranch property to the development effort. 
That Ockey received no benefit from cancellation of the stock is critical to 
the "affirmance" element. The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 98 (1958) 
succinctly addresses the matter: 
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If the purported principal is otherwise entitled to possession of the things 
received as the result of the agent's act, his receipt of them does not 
constitute affirmance. 
Id. at Comment c. The benefits Ockey received from development of the Ranch ~ 
a share of the lot sales proceeds — would have been received regardless of whether 
his stock was improperly canceled. In fact, had Ockey received his stock in IMAI, 
he would have received additional benefits in the form of distributions from IMAI. 
In short, defendants proved none of the elements required to establish 
Ockey ratified the conversion. The trial court's contrary conclusion is wrong as a 
matter of law. 
IV. THE HEARSAY STATEMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY NICK 
CONDAS ARE INADMISSIBLE. 
In response to the breach of fiduciary duty and conversion claims, Lehmer 
argued he was not personally responsible for his actions since he was only 
following "instructions" from Nick Condas. The alleged instructions, according to 
Lehmer, were basqd on conversations Nick Condas had "with various 
[unidentified] members of the extended Condas family ..." who agreed: 
a. John Lehmer, as Lessor's Representative under the Option to Ground 
Lease, should receive the stock of Iron Mountain Alliance, Inc. ("IMAI") 
from Gerry Jackson and Hank Rothwell; 
b. John Lehmer, as Lessor's Representative, should vote the IMAI shares to 
elect a new Board of Directors consisting of Nick Condas, John Condas, 
and John Lehmer, and that the board should appoint the same individuals as 
officers of IMAI; 
c. The newly elected board of IMAI I should cancel the shares received 
from Jackson and Rothwell and issue new shares at $1 per share for those 
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members of the family who contributed toward the state lease payment that 
was then due and owing. 
(R. 4294-95) To ensure he could rely on the alleged instructions, Lehmer filed a 
motion in limine.17 The trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion and 
allowing the testimony. 
A, The Alleged Instructions Are Not Relevant. 
Lehmer's first evidentiary hurdle was relevance. He claimed Nick's 
alleged instructions were relevant for two purposes: (1) they go to the existence, 
scope and performance of Lehmer's duties as Lessor's Representative, and (2) 
they pertain to the apportionment of fault between Lehmer, Nick and others. 
Neither purpose was advanced by the alleged instructions. 
The existence and scope of Lehmer's duties as Lessor's Representative 
were defined by two documents, not the alleged instructions from Nick. The role 
of Lessor's Representative was created by agreement of all parties to the first 
Option to Ground Lease four years before the alleged instructions. Section 2.4.c. 
of the agreement provides that the family members, as Lessors: 
shall be required to designate to Lessee in writing one of their 
number as the official recipient of all payments of Option 
Consideration and all notices under the Option Agreement 
("Lessor's Representative"). Each Lessor's Representative shall 
also provide Lessee with a power of attorney from all other owners 
and beneficiaries comprising that Lessor demonstrating his or its 
authority to act on behalf of the others and all matters requiring 
Lessor's consent, cooperation, or assistance under the Option 
Agreement. 
Nick Condas passed away before he could be deposed or provide an affidavit. 
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(R. 3288) The scope of Lehmer's duties was defined by the Option to Ground 
Lease and by the written powers of attorney given by every family member to 
Lehmer as required by the Option to Ground Lease.18 Neither document was 
subject to amendment by verbal instruction from Nick Condas.19 
The second relevance argument — that the alleged instructions pertain to 
apportionment of fault between Lehmer and Nick Condas -- is based on a 
misreading of Utah's comparative fault law. Only individuals who breached a 
duty owed to Ockey may be included on a special verdict form for the purpose of 
apportioning fault. See Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 2001 Utah 107, ^ 62, 
37 P.3d 1130. Nick Condas owed Ockey no duty in connection with the IMAI 
stock received from Jackson and Rothwell. 
Nick's alleged instructions made to Lehmer and other family members 
were irrelevant and should have been excluded on that basis alone. 
B. The Alleged Instructions Are Inadmissible Hearsay. 
Lehmer's second evidentiary hurdle was the hearsay rule. He argued the 
alleged instructions were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted and, 
18
 A copy of the Power of Attorney Ockey provided to Lehmer can be found at R. 
3452-3456 and in the Addendum. 
19
 See Option to Ground Lease at §31.9, which requires that any amendment be in 
writing. (R. 3405) Regarding the Power of Attorney, it is axiomatic that only the 
principal can modify the authority granted an agent. See also Utah Code Ann. 
§25-5-1(1953) ("No... trust or power over or concerning real property or in any 
manner relating thereto, shall be created... otherwise than by... conveyance in 
writing subscribed by the party creating... the same, or by his lawful agent 
thereunto authorized by writing.") 
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therefore, do not run afoul the hearsay rule. As noted, however, Lehmer had no 
relevant basis for offering the instructions if not for their truth. 
Lehmer also argued that the alleged instructions were admissible under the 
residual exceptions to the hearsay rule found in Rule 804(b)(5) of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. The residual or "catchall" exceptions to the rule "[were] intended for 
use in those rare cases where [the statement's] admission is justified by the 
inherent reliability of the statement and the need for its admission." State v. 
Nelson, 111 P.2d 479, 482 (Utah 1989); see also, United States v. Trujillo, 136 
F.3d 1388 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the exceptions are used very rarely and 
only in exceptional circumstances). 
In State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, 32 P.3d 976, the Court of Appeals 
identified eight factors used to consider whether a hearsay statement has sufficient 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness to be admitted under the residual 
exception. Lehmer focused on three. He argued the instructions were based on 
Nick's personal knowledge and he never recanted them. As described by Lehmer, 
the instructions were apparently based on personal knowledge and not recanted. 
Lehmer also argued the instructions were corroborated, pointing to two 
"independent" pieces of corroborative evidence. (R. 4297) The first is a letter 
from Nick to Ockey's original counsel in this matter. The letter is a disavowal of 
any involvement in IMAI, not a corroboration of the alleged instructions. After 
three pages detailing how the family managed its assets and distributed income 
Nick addresses IMAI in one sentence: "The remainder of your letter relates to Iron 
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Mountain Alliance and does not directly involve me." (R. 4306) Nick's disclaimer 
regarding involvement in IMAI is directly contrary to the involvement that 
Lehmer claims is detailed in the alleged instructions. 
The second piece of "independent" evidence is minutes of a meeting 
involving only Lehmer.20 Not only was Lehmer the only attendee, he drafted the 
minutes. In no sense are the minutes "independent" corroborative evidence. 
Moreover, the minutes do not mirror the alleged instructions from Nick. For 
example, Lehmer did not write in the minutes that the family members agreed 
Lehmer should receive the IMAI stock. The minutes do not state IMAI should 
cancel the shares Lehmer received as Lessor's Representative. And nowhere in 
the minutes did Lehmer write that Nick instructed him to issue new shares to those 
family members who made the state lease payment. In short, the self-serving 
minutes simply do not corroborate the alleged instructions. 
The most direct indication that the alleged instructions had insufficient 
"circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness..." is found in the testimony of the 
family members other than Lehmer and his personally appointed IMAI co-
director, John Condas. Contrary to the alleged instructions, ah other family 
member testified they never agreed to relinquish their IMAI stock. 
In short, even if the alleged instructions were relevant, they lack the 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness necessary under the residual 
20
 A copy of the minutes can be found at R. 4302 and in the Addendum. 
21
 See discussion in point V.C., infra; see also R. 3704-21, 3726-27'. 
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exception to the hearsay rule. This is simply not the "rare case" where admission 
"is justified by the inherent reliability of the statement and the need for its 
admission." State v. Nelson, 111 P.2d 479? 482 (Utah 1989). The court abused its 
discretion in granting the motion and allowing evidence of the instructions at trial. 
V. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT 
OCKEY HAD TIMELY KNOWLEDGE OF HIS CONVERSION CLAIM 
Following trial, the court dismissed the conversion claims as untimely 
under the three-year statute of limitations found at Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(2) 
(1996), concluding that the claims accrued on July 1, 1993, more than three years 
before Ockey filed his complaint on June 19, 1997. (R. 4604) The trial court 
reached its conclusion based on the following finding: "[Ockey] either knew or 
had reason to know of the events giving rise to a conversion claim within the three 
years after any conversion of IMAI stock." (R. 4599) 
The "events giving rise to ... [the] conversion claim ..." all occurred on July 
1, 1993, and are described in the minutes of two meetings held that day. The first 
"meeting" involved only Lehmer as sole "shareholder" of IMAI. (R. 2995) The 
minutes reveal Lehmer took delivery of "100% of the stock of the Company ... as 
a means of transferring the ownership of the Company to the various members of 
the Condas family." (R. 2995).22 Lehmer then "voted" the stock to elect himself, 
John Condas and Nick Condas as the new Board of Directors for IMAI. Id. 
Lehmer agrees Ockey was among the "members of the Condas family ..." for 
whom he took delivery of the stock. (TT 988-989) 
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Finally, Lehmer "delivered and transferred [the stock] to the Company for 
cancellation." Id. 
The second meeting, a "special meeting of the newly constituted Board of 
Directors..." of IMAI, was apparently also held on July 1, 1993. (R. 2997) The 
minutes of the meeting reveal the meeting "was convened to accomplish various 
organizational duties required in connection with the change in stock 
ownership...." Id. Among other tasks accomplished, the directors "canceled" the 
"previous form of stock certificate ..." and replaced it "with the new form of stock 
certificate ...."Id. 
A. Evidentiary Basis for the Trial Court's Finding 
1. Documentary Evidence Supporting the Finding 
• "Minutes of Special Meeting of the Shareholder of Iron Mountain Alliance, 
Inc." dated July 1, 1993. (R. 2995) The minutes note: 
Nick Condas, acting as the family communicator, contacted the 
members of the Condas family to determine their desires for... a course 
of action for the payment of the debts of the Company and the expenses 
associated with the ongoing development.... the family members 
directive is... to use the Company is a mechanism to compensate those 
family members who fund the development effort, whether through cash 
payment or by delivery of services. 
2. Trial Testimony Supporting the Finding 
• Lehmer testified that Nick Condas told him he "had gone to the family and 
they decided the best way to take the IMAI assets was through this stock 
transfer.... [H]e said he spoke with the family about it and that the family 
decision was to pursue that." (TT 152) 
32 
• On cross-examination, defense counsel and Ockey read from Ockey's 
deposition transcript as follows: 
Q Question, "In 1993 did you know that Jackson and Rothwell had 
gone into default and the family would be acquiring their stock in IMAI?" 
A My answer was "No, not until some later date, a later date." 
Q Question, "Do you recall how much later?" 
A Answer, "Probably at least a year maybe more." (TT 256) 
• Ockey testified that sometime in 1994 he learned that Nick Condas and other 
family members owned IMAI stock. (TT 258) 
• Ockey testified that nobody prevented him from making further inquiries about 
purchasing IMAI stock in 1993 or 1994. (TT 262-263) 
• Alexandra Ockey testified that prior to 1989 her "recollection is that... [Scott] 
understood what was going on..." at the ranch. (TT 569) 
• Alexandra Ockey testified that between 1989 and January 1994 she discussed 
the ranch "and what was going on at the ranch with Scott...." "Scott was living 
at the ranch most of the time over those years." (TT 570) 
• When ask whether she knew "if Scott was aware of how the Jackson and 
Rothwell stock was handled...," Alexandra Ockey testified: "I only have the 
knowledge that he lived with my brother, Nick, and things were freely 
discussed with him .... I'm inclined to think... [he] knew. Whether or not... [he] 
knew I don't know." (TT 629) 
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• Ellen Bay as testified that Nick Condas was the "family communicator." (TT 
811) "Whatever he was doing, he would tell us in great detail and if we 
wanted to know more about it we might ask him." (TT 812) 
• Hermione Bayas Klekas agreed that Nick Condas was the "family 
communicator." She testified "he'd talk to everyone and he lived with Scott so 
talked to him too I imagine." (TT 819) 
• John Condas's deposition testimony was read at trial, including the following 
excerpts: 
Q My question is, how are you going to handle this asset? What was 
the agreement among the family members? 
A Well, I think that stock was not going to be distributed on a 
percentage of ownership based on everyone's percentage ownership in 
IMHG but rather be distributed upon people's investment in, investment in 
the entity whether that was with money or services. 
Q Tell me the name of every family member that you know that agreed 
to this agreement as you put it. 
A I think it was unanimous. Our family for better or worse, for almost 
all decisions, ran things based on a requirement of unanimity.... 
Q Right. On what do you base your conclusion that this was a 
unanimous agreement among family members? 
A Well, for starters, the reason I just said that that was the practice the 
family had always had. But also, I had the sessions with John Lehmer and 
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Uncle Nick about this that, you know, Uncle Nick had been, because of his 
unique relationship with other family members, he would go down and 
discuss things with all the family members and it was, you know, my 
impression through what he told me and what I heard from John, that he 
had gotten everyone to concur with this. 
Q Okay. So your understanding of the family concurrence to not 
distribute stock based on ownership but instead to, I guess, use stock as a 
means to get money and services for the entity, that knowledge is based on 
your conversations with Uncle Nick and John Lehmer alone? 
A Well, as far as conversations. But again, as I said, it made perfect 
sense, given the way the family had always transacted business and made 
family decisions.... (TT 899-900) 
• Lehmer testified that Nick Condas's role in the family was to communicate 
with family members regarding family business. (TT 924) 
• Lehmer testified that the "lines of communication" were between "Nick and his 
siblings." Nick would, however, "from time to time... [involve Lehmer's] 
cousins in the discussions." (TT 925) 
• Regarding "lines of communication," Lehmer was asked whether, "if for 
example, Nick went out and had a decision to make and would talk with his 
five brothers and sisters and was that generally sufficient communication if he 
talked with his five siblings?" (TT 926) Lehmer answered: "Well, we always 
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treated it that way. It was — the result of those conversations would end up or 
finally result in a family decision on how to proceed." Id. 
• Lehmer testified that a decision was made to "reinvest [the stock received from 
Jackson and Rothwell] ... into the project and use it as a mechanism of fueling 
this development, of continuing to get people to work, to get them to provide 
funds so that we could push the development along and continue to try to get 
this development to ultimately bear fruit." (TT 955) Lehmer testified that "the 
family as a whole..." made the decision. (TT 956) 
• Regarding how the family's decision was communicated to him, Lehmer 
testified: "[T]he final consensus directive came [from] Nick Condas saying this 
is what the family has decided to do and he instructed me on the names and the 
effort to issue the stock for $1000 each to the six individuals because those 
were the people who are paying the money to buy that stock so the corporation 
had the funds to pay the rent." (TT 957) 
• Lehmer was asked: "Assuming Nick had just talked with his siblings, would 
that have been consistent in the way family business was conducted?" Lehmer 
answered: "That's the way historically it had been conducted. I understood that 
he's spoken to everyone but, you know, I wasn't present at the conversation. I 
don't know who he spoke to." (TT 958-959) 
The trial court found that Ockey knew or had reason to know of the events 
giving rise to a conversion claim because it seemed likely to the court that Ockey 
was among the family members who spoke with Nick Condas about the stock. As 
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Lehmer wrote in the shareholder meeting minutes, "Nick Condas, acting as the 
family communicator, contacted the members of the Condas family to determine 
their desires ...."(R. 2995) 
The trial court also considered Ockey's testimony that places his knowledge 
of the family's IMAI stock acquisition at a point in time that is likely less than 
three years after the acquisition. (TT 256) Finally, the court may have considered 
the testimony from several witnesses concerning Ockey's interest in the Ranch as 
evidence of the likelihood that he had reason to know his stock was converted. 
B. The Finding Is Contradicted by the Clear Weight of the Evidence 
Even when viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court, the evidence 
is legally insufficient to support the finding. First, no direct evidence exists that 
Ockey knew or had reason to know of the relevant events. Like every other 
witness, Lehmer testified he never spoke with Ockey about distribution of the 
IMAI stock. (TT 169) At best, the evidence is circumstantial. 
Second, the primary piece of circumstantial evidence is inadmissible 
hearsay. Lehmer and John Condas, two of the three directors involved in 
canceling the stock, both testified that the third director, Nick Condas, told them 
he had spoken with "the family" about the stock. (TT 152) As explored more 
fully in Point IV, supra, the alleged comments from Nick Condas are hearsay and 
should have been excluded. 
Third, no witness testified that Ockey was among the family members 
allegedly contacted by Nick Condas. In response to the question "you don't know 
37 
who Uncle Nick talked to?" Lehmer testified: "I just know that he said he spoke 
with the family about it and that the family decision was to pursue that." (TT 152) 
Ockey testified that he first learned in the "mid-90s ..." that Jackson and Rothwell 
transferred stock in lieu of payments under the Option to Ground Lease. (TT 219) 
He recalled receiving no information from Lehmer or Nick Condas in the summer 
of 1993 regarding the IMAI stock. (TT 219-220) 
The trial testimony established quite convincingly that Ockey was not alone 
among family members kept in the dark. No family member knew or had reason 
to know of the key events other than Lehmer and his co-directors: 
• Marina Condas Julis, Ockey and Lehmer's cousin, first learned that Lehmer 
acquired the IMAI stock "a couple of years ..." before her trial testimony in 
January 2002. (TT 174) No one consulted her about how to distribute the 
stock in 1993, and she never instructed Lehmer or Nick Condas to take any 
particular action with regard to the stock. (TT 175) 
• Hermione Bay as Klekas, another cousin, told the same story. She was not 
aware that Lehmer received the IMAI stock in 1993 (TT 202), and nobody 
spoke with her about what should be done with the stock. (TT 203) 
• Ellen Ockey Johnson, Ockey's sister, testified she did not speak with Nick 
Condas regarding IMAI stock in 1993. (TT 835-836) In 1993 she was not 
aware that Lehmer had received IMAI stock. (TT 836) In fact, she did not 
recall speaking with anyone about IMAI stock before 1996. (TT 835) 
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• Chris Condas, Nick Condas's brother and Ockey and Lehmer's uncle, testified 
that he did not know the "family" had received stock from Jackson and 
Rothwell. (TT 503)23 
• Alexandra Ockey, Nick Condas's sister and Ockey's mother, testified that in 
July 1995 Lehmer told her: 
[The IMAI] Corp. stock should have been split among the legal 
owners of record; instead it was arranged that the stock be 
distributed to the real parties in interest, the brothers and sisters, not 
the straw ... owners of the land, the children." (TT 523-524) 
Like her brother Chris Condas, Alexandra Ockey testified that she could recall 
no contact from Nick Condas or John Lehmer regarding the IMAI stock in 
1993. (TT 619-620) Further, she testified she did not participate in the 
arrangement by which stock was distributed. (TT 620) 
In short, the clear weight of the evidence contradicts the finding that, within 
three years of the conversion, Ockey knew or had reason to know of the events 
giving rise to his claim. 
VL THE EVIDENCE OF CONCEALMENT JUSTIFIED APPLICATION 
OF THE DISCOVERY RULE. 
Lehmer took delivery of the IMAI stock around July 1, 1993. At the time, 
he was functioning in his capacity as a fiduciary for Ockey and the other family 
members pursuant to authority granted by individual powers of attorney. (TT 90-
91) As a member of the Utah State Bar, and as he admitted to his aunt Alexandra 
Chris Condas passed away before trial. 
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Ockey two years later, Lehmer kne™ fhf> "ctr^v should have been split among the 
legal owners of record...," including Ockey. (TT 523-524) 
Instead, Lehmer put the stock certificates in his file cabinet and never said a 
word about them to Ockey. (TT 101, 140 & 169) According to the minutes 
Lehmer created, he surrendered the stock to the corporation for cancellation, then 
put on his director's hat and, with the other two directors, canceled the stock. All 
of this happened on the same day. Nobody else was present. For at least two 
years, no one was ever told that any of this had been done. 
Because of Lehmer1 s and IMAI's conduct, Ockey was never recognized as a 
shareholder. No stock transfer to Ockey was ever registered on IMAI's books. 
Both Lehmer and his replacement as president and director testified that the 
company never considered Ockey a stockholder. (TT 102-103 and 512-514) 
Under the circumstances, the concealment version of the equitable 
discovery rule operates to toll the statute of limitations. The concealment version 
of the rule may apply "where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of 
action because of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct." Russell 
Packard Dev., In$. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ^  25, 108 P.3d 741 (citations omitted). 
The question is whether "given the defendant's actions, the plaintiff acted 
reasonably in failing to file suit before the limitations period expired." Id. % 30. 
The question is narrow: given the conduct of Lehmer and IMAI, was there 
anything unreasonable about Ockey's failure to learn of the events of July 1, 1993 
within three years of that date? Given the evidence, the answer is no. Like every 
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other family member except Lehmer's co-directors, Ockey did not know Lehmer 
received IMAI stock and immediately surrendered it to the company for 
cancellation. Years later, Lehmer disclosed his conduct to least one family 
member, but there is simply no evidence that it was either disclosed to Ockey or 
that Ockey acted unreasonably in failing to learn the truth. 
The concealment version of the equitable discovery rule should have 
operated to toll the conversion statute of limitations. The trial court's contrary 
conclusion was error. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING IT COULD NOT 
FASHION AN EQUITABLE REMEDY FOR LEHMER'S BREACH OF 
FIDUCIARY DUTY AND CONVERSION. 
At the end of trial, after concluding Ockey had no adequate remedy at law, 
the trial court decided it could not fashion an equitable remedy and dismissed the 
breach of fiduciary duty and conversion claims against Lehmer for lack of a 
remedy. The court concluded it could not force Lehmer to convey a portion of his 
23% ownership interest in IMAI to Ockey because doing so would be awarding 
"damages in the disguise of equity ...." (TT 1043) 
The error in the court's analysis lies in its characterization of stock. What 
Lehmer took was Ockey's ownership interest in the company. Jackson and 
Rothwell endorsed their stock certificates and delivered them to Lehmer as a 
"means of transferring the ownership of [IMAI] to the various members of the 
Condas Family." (R. 2995) The fact that Lehmer put the certificates in a filing 
cabinet and never disclosed their existence to Ockey goes only to the concealment 
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issue. The conversion occurred when Lehmer "surrendered" the stock to the 
company for "cancellation" without first ensuring new stock would be issued to 
Ockey and the others in proportion to their ownership interest. As a matter of 
proper legal characterization, Lehmer converted Ockey's ownership interest not his 
stock certificates. 
Under its equitable powers, the court could have restored Ockey's 
ownership interest by ordering Lehmer to convey a portion of the ownership 
interest he held in the company. But the court could not get over the conceptual 
hurdle posed by its view that the remedy Ockey sought amounted to giving Ockey 
stock certificates different from those Lehmer converted. During argument on the 
issue, the court noted: 
If the stock was converted, it's not in [Lehmer's] hands. It was 
wrongfully taken from plaintiffs and they can get it from IMAI 
But it doesn't have an identity as such that Mr. Lehmer has their 
stock. So he can't pay them back their stock. This is the time to tell 
me if I'm wrong on that. I don't see how you can say that's their 
stock that he has. (TT 1044) 
Ockey's counsel responded: "But what is stock? Stock is the physical 
manifestation of an ownership interest in the company." Id. In other words, the 
form of the stock certificate held by Lehmer is irrelevant. He took from Ockey an 
ownership interest in IMAI and he had the means to restore what he took. Under 
these circumstances, the court's refusal to fashion an equitable remedy was error. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's summary judgment decisions, 
conclude the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the hearsay statements 
allegedly made by Nick Condas, conclude the trial court committed clear error in 
finding support for the statue of limitations defense, conclude the concealment 
version of the discovery rule applies, and remand the case with instructions to 
enter judgment in favor of Ockey granting the equitable remedy he sought. 
DATED this 31st day of October, 2006. 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Eric P. Lee 
Attorney for Appellant 
43 
ADDENDUM 
44 
ADDENDUM CONTENTS 
February 2, 2001 Order (R. 3578) 
February 15, 2001 Order (R. 3747) 
November 5, 2001 Order (R. 3956) 
January 22,2002 Order (R. 4525) 
February 8, 2002 Order on Reconsideration of Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment Re: Conversion (R. 4548) 
Docket (page 50) 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 4590) 
Trust Agreement -- Scott Ockey Trust #1 (R. 219) 
Trust Agreement -- Scott Ockey Trust #2 (R. 232) 
Settlement Agreement (R. 1157) 
Power of Attorney (R. 3452) 
Minutes of Special Meeting of the Shareholder of Iron Mountain 
Alliance, Inc. (R. 4302) 
Craig G. Adamson (0024) 
Eric P. Lee (4870) 
Craig A. Hoggan (8202) 
DART ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
Joseph E. Wrona (8746) 
WAKEFIELD & WRONA 
2029 Sidewinder Drive, 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 682186 
Park City, UT 84068-2186 
Telephone: (435) 649-6251 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
SCOTT OCKEY, CATHERINE CONDAS, 
individually and for and on behalf of all 
similarly situated members and shareholders 
of IRON MOUNTAIN HOLDING GROUP, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, and 
IRON MOUNTAIN ALLIANCE, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JOHN LEHMER, JOHN CONDAS, 
ALEXANDRA OCKEY, ELLEN BAYAS, 
ESTATE OF NICK CONDAS, IRON 
MOUNTAIN HOLDING GROUP, L.C., 
a Utah limited liability company, and 
IRON MOUNTAIN ALLIANCE, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
No 
FILED 
By-
FEB 0 2 2001 
Third District Court 
Deputy Clerk, Summit Coui Sty 
ORDER 
Civil No. 97-03-00081CV 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
Defendants. : 
—oooOooo— 
Plaintiffs Scott Ockey and Cathy Condas's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
plaintiffsi' Motion to Substitute Estate of Nick Condas, plaintiffs' Motion For Leave to File Third 
Amended Complaint, Defendant Ellen Bay as' Motion to Compel and Defendant John Lehmer's 
Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment came before the Court for hearing on December 
18, 2000. Eric P. Lee and Craig A. Hoggan appeared for plaintiffs. Gerry D'Elia appeared for 
defendants George Condas, Alexandra Ockey and John Condas. Matthew L. Lalli appeared for 
defendant John LehmeJ:. Dennis J. Conroy appeared for defendant Ellen Bayas. Michael S. 
Johnson appeared for defendants Iron Mountain Holding Group, L.C. and Iron Mountain Alliance, 
Inc. In addition to the above-referenced motions, the Court also dealt with several scheduling 
matters in anticipation of the upcoming trial. Having reviewed the pleadings on file and 
considering the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
SCHEDULING MATTERS: 
1. All parties shall fully respond to written discovery, including supplemental responses, 
by January 5, 2001. 
2. Depositions may be taken after the January 5, 2001 cutoff. 
3. Unless provided in response to written discovery, final witness and exhibit lists shall 
be provided to opposing parties and the Court no later than ten days before trial. 
4. Motions in limine must be filed no later than five days before trial. 
5. The parties may submit jury instructions up to the first day of trial. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL: 
2 
6. Based on the fact that defendants5 motion was not filed until December 12, 2000, and 
that plaintiffs have npt had the ability to respond pursuant to Rule 4-501, this motion is not 
properly before the Court at this time. 
7. Plaintiffs, however, are instructed to respond to all outstanding discovery by January 
5,2001. 
8. The Court reserves the issues of sanctions until trial. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: 
9. Based on the fact that defendants' motion was not filed until December 12, 2000, and 
that plaintiffs have not had the ability to respond pursuant to Rule 4-501, this motion is not 
properly before the Court at this time. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO FILE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT:' 
10. Plaintiffs' motion does not subject defendants to any undue prejudice. However, since 
punitive damages were not expressly requested in the Second Amended Complaint, a prayer for 
relief requesting punitive damages shall not be included in the Third Amended Complaint. With 
this exception, plaintiffs' Motion to File Third Amended Complaint is granted. Plaintiffs are 
instructed to remove the request for punitive damages from their Third Amended Complaint before 
filing. 
MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE ESTATE: 
11. Plaintiffs' motion is not properly before the Court at this time. Plaintiffs have not yet 
served John Lehmer, the personal representative of the Estate of Nick Condas, with a copy of their 
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motion and a notice of hearing. Plaintiffs are instructed to serve Lehmer and resubmit this matter 
for decision on an expedited basis. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT: 
12. Plaintiffs' motion is denied without prejudice. The Court grants plaintiffs leave to 
submit a supplemental memorandum tp address the impact of Utah Code Ann. §75-7-409. 
DATED this J</#day of^ ecefflBfer 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BY THE COURT: 
Efb6kkT K. HILDER 
District Judge 
5 0^5 - ^ ^ 
APPROVED AS TO FORlfafr/;,,,,^^ 
Matthew L. Lalli 
Attorney for Defendants 
Dennis J. Conroy 
Attorney for Defendants 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Michael S. Johnson 
Attorney for^ Defendants 
Gerry D'Elia 
Attorney for Defendants 
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motion and a notice of hearing. Plaintiffs are instructed to serve Lehmer and resubmit this matter 
for decision on an expedited basis. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT: 
12. Plaintiffs' motion is denied without prejudice. The Court grants plaintiffs leave to 
submit a supplemental memorandum to address the impact of Utah Code Ann. §75-7-409. 
DATED this day of December, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ROBERT K. HILDER 
District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
'-A Matthew L. Lalli 
Attorney for Defendants 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Dennis J. Conroy 
Attorney for Defendants 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Michael S. Johnson 
Attorney for Defendants 
Gerry D'Elia 
Attorney for Defendants 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
Joseph E. Wrona (8746) 
WAKEFIELD & WRONA 
2029 Sidewinder Drive, 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 682186 
Park City, UT 84068-2186 
Telephone: (435) 649-6251 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
SCOTT OCKEY, CATHERINE CONDAS, : 
individually and for and on behalf of all : ORDER 
similarly situated members and shareholders : 
of IRON MOUNTAIN HOLDING GROUP, : 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, and : 
IRON MOUNTAIN ALLIANCE, INC., a : 
Utah corporation, : 
Plaintiffs, : 
v. : Civil No. 97-03-O0O81CV 
JOHN LEHMER, JOHN CONDAS, : Judge Robert K. Hilder 
ALEXANDRA OCKEY, ELLEN BAYAS, : 
ESTATE OF NICK CONDAS, IRON : 
MOUNTAIN HOLDING GROUP, L.C., : 
a Utah limited liability company, and : 
IRON MOUNTAIN ALLIANCE, INC., : 
a Utah corporation, : 
Defendants. : 
F E S t 5 2001 
S y
 Tfiird District Court 
—oooOooo— 
On January 17, 2001, the Court heard oral argument on the following motions: (1) 
Defendant John Lehmer's Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; (2) Plaintiffs' Motion 
to Modify Order to add punitive damages; (3) Plaintiffs' Motion for Continuance or Bifurcation; 
(4) Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension to Supplement Interrogatory Answers; and (5) Plaintiffs' 
Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Eric P. 
Lee and Craig J. Wangsgard appeared on behalf of plaintiffs. Matthew L. Lalli appeared on 
behalf of defendant John Lehmer. Gerry D'Elia appeared on behalf of defendants Alexandra 
Ockey and John Condas. Dennis J. Conroy appeared on behalf of defendant Ellen Bay as. 
Michael S. Johnson appeared on behalf of defendants Iron Mountain Alliance, Inc. and Iron 
Mountain Holding Group, L.C. 
Based upon the supporting and opposing memoranda and exhibits thereto, the argument 
of counsel, and the record in this matter, and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
1.Defendant John Lehmer's Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is 
granted in part and denied in part, as follows. 
a. Causes of action 1 and 2 of the Third Amended Complaint fail as a matter 
of law, and hereby are dismissed with prejudice, because plaintiffs' ratified the 
conveyances of their interests in the Condas Family Ranch to Iron Mountain Alliance, Ltd. 
and subsequently to Iron Mountain Holding Group, L.C. and Iron Mountain Associates, 
L.L.C. 
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b. The remaining causes of action in the Third Amended Complaint fail as a matter 
of law, and hereby are dismissed with prejudice, only to the extent they are predicated on 
the alleged wrongful conveyance of plaintiffs' interests in the Condas Family Ranch to 
Iron Mountain Alliance, Ltd. and subsequently to Iron Mountain Holding Group, L.C. and 
Iron Mountain Associates, L.L.C. 
c. With the exception noted in subparagraph 1(b), above, the motion is denied with 
respect to cause of action 9 of the Third Amended Complaint. 
2. Plaintiffs' Motion to Modify Order is denied. Plaintiffs shall not be allowed to include 
a claim for punitive damages in the Third Amended Complaint. 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion for Continuance or Bifurcation is granted with respect to the 
continuance and denied with respect to the bifurcation. The parties shall appear in court on 
February 8, 2001 at 9:00 a.m. for the purpose of arguing all outstanding summary judgment 
motions and setting a new trial date and pretrial cutoff dates. 
4. In light of the continuance granted in paragraph 3, above, plaintiffs' Motion for 
Extension to Supplement Interrogatory Answers is granted. The parties are ordered to complete 
as much of the outstanding discovery as possible before February 8, 2001, and should be prepared 
to discuss with the court at that tin e^ any further outstanding discovery issues. 
DATED t h i s / T ^ day of J ^ 3 l . 
BY THE CO 
TH^^NbRABl^E KOBERTKglLMfyi,T %%\ 
DISTRICT JUDGE 1 ^ | COUNTY | ^ J 
3 '"'/winning (MNO-DOC/OCKEY-SC0TT.0RDERRE1-17-01HEARINGJNS 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of January, 2001,1 caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to the following: 
Matthew L. Lalli 
SNELL & WILMER 
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Michael S. Johnson 
PRUITT, GUSHEE & BACHTELL 
36 South State Street, Suite 1850 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Dennis J. Conroy 
SILVESTER & CONROY 
230 South 500 East, Suite 590 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Gerry D'Elia 
D'ELIA & LEHMER 
7620 Royal Street East, Suite 201 
P.O. Box 626 
Park City, UT 84060 
John R. Lehmer, Personal Representative 
Estate of Nick J. Condas 
D'ELIA & LEHMER 
7620 Royal Street East, Suite 201 
P.O. Box 626 
Park City, UT 84060 
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SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT OCKEY, CATHERINE CONDAS, 
individually and for and on behalf of all 
similarly situated members and shareholders 
of IRON MOUNTAIN HOLDING GROUP, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, and 
IRON MOUNTAIN ALLIANCE, INC, a 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NICK CONDAS, ELLEN BAYAS, JOHN 
LEHMER, ALEXANDRA OCKEY, JOHN 
CONDAS, IRON MOUNTAIN HOLDING 
GROUP, L.C, a Utah limited liability 
company, and IRON MOUNTAIN 
ALLIANCE, INC, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Case No. 97-03-00081CV 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
On October 17, 2001, the court heard oral argument on the following motions: (1) 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment re Conversion; (2) Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment re John Lehmer's Breaches; (3) Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment re Nick Condas' Breaches; and (4) Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Lalhm\SLC\l 867001 
Judgment re Ellen Bayas' Breaches. Eric P. Lee appeared on behalf of plaintiffs. Matthew L. 
LalU appeared on behalf of defendant John Lehmer. Gerry D'Elia appeared on behalf of 
defendants Alexandra Ockey and John Condas. Dennis J. Conroy appeared on behalf of 
defendant Ellen Bayas and the estate of Nick Condas. Michael S. Johnson appeared on behalf of 
defendants Iron Mountain Alliance, Inc. and Iron Mountain Holding Group, L.C. 
Based upon the supporting and opposing memoranda and exhibits thereto, the argument 
of counsel, and the record in this matter, and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
All motions are denied on the basis that there are disputed issues of material fact. 
(& AjU 
DATED this J day of OptdJer, 2001. 
BY THE jCOI 
Honorable Robert K. flildel§f S(J/^/r %^ 1 
Third District Judge 1 5 CQ,* §oa 
% % -'"VTy # « I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER, postage 
prepaid, this day of October, 2001, to the following: 
Craig G. Adamson 
Eric P. Lee 
Craig A. Hoggan 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
370 East South Temple, #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Michael S. Johnson 
PRUITT, GUSHEE & BACHTELL 
Suite 1850 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Joseph E. Wrona 
WAKEFIELD & WRONA 
2029 Sidewinder Drive, 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 682186 
Park City, UT 84068-2186 
Gerry D'Elia 
D'ELIA & LEHMER 
7620 Royal Street East, Suite 201 
P.O. Box 626 
Park City, UT 84060 
Dennis J. Conroy 
SILVESTER & CONROY 
230 South 500 East, Suite 590 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Lallim\SLC\l 867001 
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Craig G. Adamson (0024) 
Eric P. Lee (4870) 
Craig A. Hoggan (8202) 
DART ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
Joseph E. Wrona (8746) 
WAKEFIELD & WRONA 
2029 Sidewinder Drive, 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 682186 
Park City, UT 84068-2186 
Telephone: (435) 649-6251 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
SCOTT OCKEY, CATHERINE CONDAS, : 
individually and for and on behalf of all : ORDER 
similarly situated members and shareholders : 
of IRON MOUNTAIN HOLDING GROUP, : 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, and : 
IRON MOUNTAIN ALLIANCE, INC., a : 
Utah corporation, : 
Plaintiffs, : 
v. : Civil No. 97-03-00081CV 
JOHN LEHMER, JOHN CONDAS, : Judge Robert K. Hilder 
ALEXANDRA OCKEY, ELLEN BAYAS, : 
ESTATE OF NICK CONDAS, IRON : 
MOUNTAIN HOLDING GROUP, L.C., 
a Utah limited liability company, and : 
IRON MOUNTAIN ALLIANCE, INC., : 
a Utah corporation, : 
Defendants. : 
—oooOooo— 
This matter came before the Court on October 17, 2001, for oral argument on the 
following motions: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Conversion; (2) 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Affidavit of John Lehmer; and (3) Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike 
Affidavit of John C. Condas. Eric P. Lee appeared for plaintiffs Scott Ockey and Cathy Condas. 
Dennis J. Conroy appeared for defendants Estate of Nick Condas and Ellen Bay as. Matthew L. 
Lalli appeared for defendant John Lehmer. Gerry D'Elia appeared for defendants Alexandra 
Ockey and John Condas. Michael S. Johnson appeared for defendants Iron Mountain Holding 
Group, L.C., and Iron Mountain Alliance, Inc. 
Based on the pleadings on file and the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Conversion is granted in part and 
denied in part. For the reasons stated in plaintiffs' memoranda, the Court concludes that Utah 
Code Ann. Section 16-10a-630 (1992) did not and does not apply to limit the preemptive rights of 
the shareholders of Iron Mountain Alliance, Inc. ("IMAI") under IMAI's March 1992 Amended 
Articles of Incorporation. The Court also concludes, however, that disputed issues of fact exist 
regarding whether either John Lehmer or IMAI converted plaintiffs' IMAI stock. 
2. The Court denies plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Affidavit of John Lehmer but only accepts 
paragraphs 9 and 10 of the January 25, 2001 Affidavit of John Lehmer as evidence of Mr. 
Lehmer's understanding, not for the truth of the matters asserted. The Court grants plaintiffs' 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of John C. Condas as to paragraph 7 of the affidavit, but denies the 
remaining portions of the motion and accepts the challenged portions of the affidavit testimony for 
purposes of the pending motions only as reflecting the understanding of John C. Condas, not for 
the truth of the matters asserted. 
DATED this ofDe 
%>o%-
BY THE COURT 
Mf"'"'1''''*, 
ROBfiRf K. HILE)ES7 District Judged" &? • u 
% 
- i =• 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the \v\ day of December, 2001,1 caused to be ^ sailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to the following: 
Matthew L. Lalli 
SNELL & WILMER 
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Michael S. Johnson 
321 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City UT 84102 
Dennis J. Conroy 
SILVESTER & CONROY 
230 South 500 East, Suite 590 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Gerry D'Elia 
D'ELIA & LEHMER 
7620 Royal Street East, Suite 201 
P.O. Box 626 
Park City, UT 84060 
Michael S. Johnson, #6903 
PRUITT, GUSHEE & BACHTELL 
Suite 1850 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-8446 
Facsimile: (801) 531-8468 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
SCOTT OCKEY, CATHERINE CONDAS, 
individually and for and on behalf of all 
similarly situated members and shareholders 
of IRON MOUNTAIN HOLDING 
GROUP, LLC, a Utah limited liability 
company, and IRON MOUNTAIN 
ALLIANCE, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN LEHMER, JOHN CONDAS, 
ALEXANDRA OCKEY, ELLEN 
BAYAS, ESTATE OF NICK CONDAS, 
IRON MOUNTAIN HOLDING 
GROUP, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, and IRON MOUNTAIN 
ALLIANCE, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants 
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION 
OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: 
CONVERSION 
Civil No. 97-03-00081CV 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
1 
The reconsideration of plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: 
Conversion came before the court on January 14, 2002. Eric P. Lee appeared for 
plaintiffs Scott Ockey and Cathy Condas. Matthew L. Lalli appeared for defendant 
John Lehmer. Michael S. Johnson appeared for defendants Iron Mountain Alliance, 
Inc. and Iron Mountain Holding Group. Dennis J. Conroy appeared for defendant 
Iron Mountain Alliance Inc. 
At the October 17, 2001 hearing on plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Re: Conversion, this Court ruled that shareholders of Iron Mountain 
Alliance, Inc. ("IMAI") possessed preemptive rights to stock issued for services 
rendered even after the July 1, 1992 enactment of the Utah Revised Business 
Corporations Act. Defendants subsequently moved for reconsideration of that 
decision. 
Based upon the previously filed briefs on this issue, upon the arguments made 
by counsel at the January 14, 2002 reconsideration hearing, and good cause 
appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
The Court rules that Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-630(2)(c) limited the scope of 
preemptive rights of IMAI shareholders upon its enactment on July 1, 1992. For the 
reasons stated in IMAFs briefs, the savings provision codified at Utah Code Ann. 
§16-10a-1704(l)(b) did not insulate IMAI from the statutory changes enacted on July 
1, 1992. The Court rules that IMAI shareholders did not possess preemptive rights 
with regard to stock issued for services from July 1, 1992 until December 31, 1995, 
the date on which IMAI adopted amended Articles of Incorporation expressly 
disclaiming the statutory limitations on preemptive rights. 
Dated this 
ie statutory limitations on pree 
us o " day ofjaatfary, 2(m2. 
BY THE COURT: 
RolSerfK-Hilder 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
6 %: 
HOB c? -I- ~\ 
I hereby certify that on this day of January, 2002,1 caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to be mailed in the United States mail, with 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Matthew L. Lalli 
SNELL & WILMER 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1004 
Dennis J. Conroy 
SILVESTER & CONROY 
230 South 500 East, Suite 590 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Eric P. Lee 
DART ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
370 E. South Temple #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
SE NUMBER 970600081 {Civil} 
-10-02 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE scheduled on January 11, 2002 at 09:30 AM 
in COURTROOM 1 with Judge HILDER. 
-11-02 Filed: JOHN CONDAS AND ALEXANDER OCKEY'S JOINDER IN IMA1'S 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER RULING ON REEMPTIVE RIGHTS 
-11-02 Filed: REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION AND MOTION TO 
EXCLUDE/EXHIBIT 
-11-02 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG A. HOGGAN 
.-11-02 Filed: REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
MOTION TO SEPARATE 
.-11-02 Filed: MOTION IN LIMINE RE: DISMISSED/SETTLED CLAIMS 
.-11-02 Filed: MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE 
EXPERT TESTIMONY OF BRAD TOWNSEND 
.-11-02 Filed: MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION IN LIMINE RE: NICK 
CONDAS'S STATEMENTS 
L-14-02 Filed: MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION IN LIMINE 
RE: CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
L-14-02 Filed: MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION IN LIMINE 
RE: BANKRUPTCY EXPERT 
L-14-02 Filed: MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION IN LIMINE 
RE: DISMISSED/SETTLED CLAIMS 
L-14-02 Filed: Reporter's Notice of Deposition of Herione Bayas Klekas 
1-14-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for {Civil} 
Judge: ROBERT K. HILDER 
Clerk: elainet 
PRESENT 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DENNIS J. CONROY 
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MATTHEW LALLI 
ERIC P LEE 
Audio 
Tape Number: cd 
motions were heard. 
1-14-02 Filed: STIPULATION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
1-14-02 Filed: IRON MOUNTAIN ALLIANCE, INC.'S VOIR DIRE REQUESTS 
1-14-02 Filed order: PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Judge rhilder 
Signed January 14, 2002 
H-14-02 Filed order: ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Judge rhilder 
Signed January 14, 2 002 
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Service Date: January 10, 2002 
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DENNIS J. CONROY (0712) 
SPENCER SffiBERS (8320) 
SILVESTER & CONROY, L.C. 
230 South 5th East, Suite 590 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone (801) 532-2266 
Attorneys for Iron Mountain Alliance, Inc 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT J. OCKEY and CATHERINE 
CONDAS, etal, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN LEHMER and IRON MOUNTAIN 
ALLIANCE, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 970^00081CV 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
This matter was brought before the Court for trial, initially by jury, beginning on January 18, 
2002 and ending on January 24, 2002, the Honorable Robert K. Hilder presiding. Eric P. Lee and 
Craig A. Hoggan appeared for Plaintiffs Scott J. Ockey ("Scott") and Cathy Condas ("Cathy"). 
Matthew L. Lalli appeared for Defendant John Lehmer ("Lehmer"). Dennis J. Conroy and Michael 
S. Johnson appeared for defendant Iron Mountain Alliance, Inc. ("EMAI"). 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 2 2 2003 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
D y
 Deputy ClerH 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This case was originally filed on June 19, 1997. The Plaintiffs amended their complaint 
several times. As of the date of trial, the controlling pleading was Plaintiffs' Third Amended 
Complaint. The Third Amended Complaint contained nine causes of action asserted against 
numerous defendants, including Lehmer and MAI. There were also various counterclaims and 
third-party claims. However, because of settlements and dismissals, the only defendants remaining 
at the time of trial were Lehmer and MAI. Furthermore, only two causes of action remained against 
these two defendants: breach of fiduciary duty against Lehmer (third cause of action) and 
conversion against Lehmer and MAI (sixth cause of action). 
On January 24, 2002, the last day of trial, all parties rested their respective cases, the jury 
was excused and various motions were argued to the court. Based upon those arguments, the law, 
and the evidence presented at trial, the court made certain bench rulings which resulted in the 
dismissal of the jury, the claims against John Lehmer being dismissed, and the Court's express 
indication that it would entering findings and conclusions that MAI has no liability to plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs never consented to a trial by jury. Defendants relied on the jury demand filed by 
Alexandra Ockey for their right to a jury trial. When Plaintiffs moved to dismiss their claims 
against Ms. Ockey very close to trial, defendants opposed the dismissal to the extent it might deprive 
them of their right to jury trial. The Court advised the parties that, if the issues that ultimately would 
be decided by the finder of fact included legal claims, the jury would decide the case because the 
Defendants rightfully relied on Alexandra Ockey's jury demand. However, if the only remaining 
issues after trial were equitable (either the claims or the remedies), then the jury would be advisory 
2 
only, unless all parties consented to the jury deciding the claims. Absent such consent, the Court 
would decide both the law and the facts. For the reasons stated below, as of January 24,2002, the 
Court determined that all remaining claims were equitable because the Plaintiffs exclusively sought 
an equitable remedy. Because of the exclusively equitable remedies requested and because Plaintiffs 
never consented to a jury, the Court announced that it was dismissing the advisory jury and would 
decide all remaining issues of fact and law. None of the parties objected. 
On January 24, 2002, Plaintiffs reiterated their position that they had no adequate remedy 
at law and were seeking only an equitable remedy for return of stock allegedly converted from 
them.1 Given Plaintiffs' admission and the Court's conclusion that Plaintiffs have no adequate 
remedy at law, the Court granted Lehmer's motion for directed verdict on the grounds that Plaintiffs 
had no remedy against Lehmer because their elected equitable remedy - return of the allegedly 
converted stock - was merely damages in the guise of equity. The Court could determine no other 
equitable remedy that could be enforced against Lehmer. 
After dismissing all claims against Lehmer, Plaintiffs then suggested that the parties waive 
closing argument and stipulate to the Court's entry of judgment. All parties agreed to the proposed 
stipulation and the Court then ruled that IMAI, the sole remaining defendant, would be dismissed 
as well. 
Having considered all the evidence presented by the parties and the arguments presented by 
counsel, the Court now enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
Because the Plaintiffs did not plead an equitable remedy with respect to their breach of fiduciary duty claim against 
Lehmer, Plaintiffs moved the Court to amend this claim to conform to the evidence The Court took the motion 
under advisement and, for the reasons stated in these findings of fact and conclusions of law, declines to decide 
Plaintiffs' motion 
3 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Condas Family Ranch (the "Ranch") historically consisted of approximately 
2,700 acres in Summit County, Utah, located between what is now known as The Canyons and Park 
City ski resorts. 
2. Before his death, John G. Condas owned the Ranch. Upon his death in 1969, John 
G. Condas conveyed the Ranch to each of his six children in undivided l/6th interests. The children 
of John G. Condas are George Condas, Ellen Condas Bayas, Nick Condas (now deceased), 
Alexandra Condas Ockey, Chris Condas (now deceased), and Mary Condas Lehmer (now deceased) 
(collectively the "Siblings"). 
3. In 1976, each of the six Siblings, except Mary Lehmer, conveyed all of their interests 
in the Ranch to irrevocable trusts established for the benefit of their children and ^ lephews, including 
Plaintiffs Scott and Cathy. The transfers into trust were made to minimize estate tax. 
4. Scott is the beneficiary under two trusts. Under the first trust, established by his 
mother, Alexandra Condas Ockey, Scott received an undivided 1/12th interest in the Ranch. Under 
the second trust, established by his uncle Nick Condas, Scott received an undivided 1/18th interest 
in the Ranch. Scott's interests equaled approximately 13.88% of the Ranch. 
5. Cathy is the beneficiary under a trust established by her father, Chris Condas. Cathy 
received an undivided l/12th interest in the Ranch. Cathy's interests equaled approximately 8.33% 
of the Ranch. Scott and Cathy's combined interests in the Ranch equalled approximately 22%. 
6. Given its favorable location and surrounding development, the Condas family has 
long had an interest in developing the Ranch. Efforts by the family to develop the Ranch stretch 
4 
back to at least 1975. 
7. Between approximately 1969-1995, business decisions concerning the Ranch and its 
developmem^followed a common course of dealing. Nick Condas, acting as the "fartiily 
communicator," contacted the various members of the Condas family, solicited their input, generated 
a consensus, and acted as the family spokesperson to direct or carry out the decisions that were 
made. 
8. In May 1989, in an effort to develop the Ranch, the family members who owned 
interests in the Ranch, including Scott and Cathy, entered into an Option To Ground Lease (the 
"Option") with Iron Mountain Resort Corporation, which later changed its name to Iron Mountain 
Alliance, Inc. ("IMAI"). At the time, IMAI was a corporation owned by developers Gerald Jackson 
("Jackson") and Hank Rothwell ("Rothwell"). Scott, Cathy, defendant John Lehmer ("Lehmer"), 
and the other family members were all designated as "Lessors" under the Option because the family 
had not yet organized itself into any formal business entity for the purposes of developing the 
Ranch. Under the terms of the Option, IMAI agreed to pay the Lessors a specified annual amount 
in exchange for an option to lease the Ranch. The parties entered into an amended Option in May 
1992, although the terms relevant to this case were unchanged by the amendment. 
9. Lehmer was appointed "Lessors' Representative" in accordance with the terms of the 
Option. As Lessors' Representative, Lehmer was designated as the "official recipient of all 
payments of Option Consideration and all notices under the Option Agreement." In addition, the 
Lessors' Representative was to receive authority from each individual lessor "to act on behalf of the 
others in all matters requiring [the individual Lessor's] consent, cooperation, or assistance under the 
5 
Option Agreement." The Option was silent concerning any distribution or dissemination of the 
Option consideration. 
10. Each of the individual Lessors, including Scott and Cathy, signed powers of attorney 
authorizing Lehmer to act as the Lessors' Representative under the Option. The powers of attorney 
signed by each of the individual Lessors, including Scott and Cathy, granted Lehmer "the authority 
to act on my behalf in all matters requiring my consent, cooperation, or assistance under the Option" 
and "full power and authority to do everything necessary in exercising any of the powers herein 
granted as fully as I might or could do if personally present." The powers of attorney were silent 
concerning any distribution or dissemination of any funds received under the Option. 
11. At the time of the Option, MAI was the lessee under a lease with the State of Utah 
(the "State Lease"), which pertained to approximately 500 acres of State owned land located in 
proximity to the Ranch. Because the parcels of land subject to the State Lease were interspersed 
within the outside boundaries of the Ranch, the State Lease land was an integral part of any 
projected development of the Ranch. The State Lease was the sole asset of MAI, but MAI had an 
annual lease obligation to pay to the State of Utah. 
12. MAI defaulted on its payment obligations under the Option. As a result of this 
default, MAI gave Lehmer as Lessors' Representative a promissory note for the lease payment and 
the parties entered into an agreement under which Jackson and Rothwell pledged their stock in MAI 
to secure payment of the amounts due under the promissory note and Option. 
13. In 1993, MAI again defaulted on its lease payment under the Option. As a result of 
this additional default, Jackson and Rothwell were obligated to tender all the stock in MAI to 
6 
Lehmer as Lessors' Representative. Because the State Lease required an annual lease payment, 
which was due at the time of the Jackson and Rothwell default, the Lessors had important decisions 
to make concerning the receipt of the MAI stock, what to do with the stock, and whether or how 
to use MAI and the State Lease to advance the common desire to develop the Ranch. 
14. To address these issues, Nick Condas contacted various members of the Condas
 A * 
family in accordance,with the family's usual business practice. AjCs a result of 4feese f*4*44^ 
communications. Nick Condas instructed Lehmer to accept the MAI stock and to elect and appoint ^jr»J*u>& 
Lehmer, Nick Condas, and John C. Condas as the directors and officers of MAI. In accordance 
with the instructions from Nick Condas, Lehmer, as Lessors' Representative and holder of MAI 
stock, elected the board of directors, which in turn appointed the officers. The MAI stock originally 
received from Jackson and Rothwell no longer exists. 
15. Lehmer also was instructed by Nick Condas tkat4fao-familyilestfedito reinvest the 
MAI stock toward the development of the Ranch and use MAI as a mechanism to compensate the 
members of the family who were willing to fund the development of the Ranch and the State Lease 
land with cash and services. At that time, there was an immediate need to make a payment on the 
State Lease and MAI had no funds with which to make the required payment. 
16. As part of the plan to compensate those family members who were willing to fund 
the development, Lehmer was instructed not to distribute the MAI shares he received from Jackson 
and Rothwell. Instead, MAI's directors resolved to offer to sell shares of MAI stock at $1.00 per 
share to representatives of each of the six families. To that end, Lehmer, Nick Condas, John C. 
Condas, George Condas, Ellen Bayas and Alexandra Ockey each purchased 1,000 shares in return 
for $1,000. The $6,000 dollars received by MAI in exchange for the new stock was used to make 
the payments on the State Lease. Similar contributions were made in exchange for stock in 
subsequent years so that MAI could make the required payments under the State Lease. Stock also 
was issued to various family members in exchange for services rendered and as approved by the 
board. 
17. MAI was one of a series of entities, the purpose of which was to meet the obligations 
of the Condas Ranch, and ultimately develop it for profit. 
18. The plaintiffs, through their ownership in the Ranch property, stood to share in any 
profits from the Ranch's ultimate development. 
19. In the late 1980s and into the 1990s, development of the Ranch was not assured. 
20. When Jackson and Rothwell gave up on their attempts to develop the Ranch in 1993, 
the return from the ownership of the Ranch was minimal, and there was an outstanding and ongoing 
liability to pay for the State Lease. 
21. The State Lease was an integral part of the envisioned transformation of the Ranch 
into a commercial real estate development. 
22. The preservation of the State Lease by MAI through its shareholders contributions 
was a speculative investment, the return on which was tied to the future development of Ranch and 
other contingencies. 
23. Scott believed that when Jackson and Rothwell transferred the MAI stock to John 
Lehmer it had only nominal value. 
24. Under the provisions of the State Lease, the family had four years to put at least one 
8 
million dollars of ski related improvements on the property, or they would lose the right to purchase 
the 505 acres subject to the lease from the state of Utah. 
25. Neither Lehmer nor IMAI at any time concealed the issuance of stock to the various 
family members in exchange for cash or services. /\/AJ 
26. As early as j»id*1993, Scott knew that IMAI stock had been issued to other family 
members. For example, Scott asked Nick Condas if Scott could buy some of Nick Condas' MAI 
stock. Nick declined but suggested that Scott inquire of other family members whether they would 
be willing to sell their stock. Scott may not have been included in much of the early to mid-1990's 
activity regarding development of the Ranch, but he was "obsessed" with the Ranch generally and 
read everything he could about the Ranch. When Scott asked Nick Condas questions about the 
Ranch, Nick directed him to all relevant records concerning the Ranch that, in fact, were maintained 
in an office Scott shared with Nick Condas. 
27. Scott had additional specific knowledge about the IMAI stock: 
a. Scott knew in 1994 that MAI Stock had been transferred by Jackson and 
Rothwell to John Lehmer. 
b. Scott knew that John Lehmer must have voted the MAI shares that were 
turned over to him. 
c. Scott knew that his cousin, John Condas, was elected as a member of the 
MAI Board. 
d. Scott knew that his mother, Alexandra Ockey, was president of IMAI, and 
she had stock in MAI. 
9 
e. Alexandra Ockey showed Scott an MAI stock ledger, reflecting who had 
shares in the corporation. 
f. Scott knew that family members were obtaining MAI stock in return for 
services rendered in furtherance of the development. 
g. Scott knew others had shares in MAI, including those who had no interest 
in Ranch. 
28. Scott either knew or had reason to know of the events giving rise to a conversion 
claim within the three years after any conversion of MAI stock. 
29. As early as mid-1993, Cathy knew that MAI stock had been issued to other family 
members and knew about the opportunity each of the six families had to purchase MAI stock at 
$1.00 per share. Cathy overheard conversations between her father, Chris Condas, and her Uncle 
Nick Condas, pertaining to the payment of the State Lease through the purchase of MAI stock. 
30. Cathy's father told her that he did not think it was a good investment to purchase 
shares in MAI. After Chris Condas decided not to purchase the stock, he told his children, Cathy 
and John C. Condas, about the opportunity to buy MAI stock and asked if they were interested in 
purchasing shares in MAI. John Condas accepted the offer and purchased stock in 1993 and in 
subsequent years. Cathy did not. 
31. Cathy had additional specific knowledge about the MAI stock: 
10 
b. Cathy knew that the offer to purchase MAI shares involved the entity that 
had the State Lease. She also knew that the lease payments to the state were 
going to go up in the following years. 
c. Cathy understood that the family members who participated in the making 
the payments on the State Lease through MAI would share in the profits, if 
any, from the Ranch's development. 
d. Cathy saw papers pertaining to MAI that revealed that John Lehmer, her 
brother and Uncle Nick had become officers or directors of the corporation. 
32. Cathy had knowledge of MAI's role as a development entity for the Ranch as a 
whole, including her interest as a member of IMHG, and acted to protect that interest by successfully 
petitioning the family to add her father, Chris Condas, as a member of the MAI Board of Directors, 
which occurred on December 12, 1993. 
33. Generally, Cathy did not want to know about the Ranch and its development. As 
further evidence of Cathy's lack of interest in the Ranch, Cathy also tried to sell her share of the 
Ranch for a sum much less than she has received to date. 
34. Cathy either knew or had reason to know of the events giving rise to a conversion 
claim within the three years after any conversion of MAI stock. 
35. As of the date of trial, ownership of stock in MAI was as follows: 
John R. Lehmer 23,500 
John C. Condas 11,362 
George J. Condas 13,357 
11 
Nick J. Condas 8,701 
Chris J. Condas 2,658 
Alexandra C. Ockey 13,357 
Susi L. Kontgis 14,474 
Ellen C. Bayas 13,357 
36. Scott and Cathy had notice of the transfer of MAI stock to others, but failed to 
timely disapprove of the transfer of the stock. 
37. The ownership of the State Lease added value to the development of the Ranch and 
ultimately allowed for the purchase by MAI of the State Lease land, 505 acres, and an additional 
410 acres that became part of the overall Ranch development. 
38. American Skiing Corporation (ASC) purchased the Wolf Mountain Resort and 
transformed it into the Canyons. As a result of MAI's position regarding the State Lease, an 
agreement was reached between the development entities and ASC that provided for the expansion 
of the Canyons to include the portions of Ranch property and allowed the family real estate 
development to become much more valuable with the inclusion of ski in - ski out lots for sale. 
39. The nature of MAI changed substantially after Jackson and Rothwell transferred 
MAI stock to Lehmer as Lessors' Representative in 1993. Numerous individuals, including Condas 
family members and various third-parties but not including the Plaintiffs, invested substantial time, 
money and other resources in developing the Ranch. 
£0. Scott and Cathy received and retained the benefits of the Ranch's development made 
possible by the issuance of the MAI stock to those who funded the development, contributed 
\ 
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services to the development, paid for the State Lease, and made possible the acquisition of additional 
property for benefit of the entire development. 
41. Scott and Cathy had knowledge of the issuance of MAI stock to those who funded 
and contributed services to the Ranch development before they accepted the benefits made possible 
by such contributions and stock issuances. 
42. Since 1993, the Ranch has become part of a successful real estate development 
through MAI and through Iron Mountain Holding Group, a limited liability company in which Scott 
and Cathy have ownership interests. Both Scott and Cathy have received substantial sums due to 
their ownership interest in the Ranch, and stand to receive more in the future. By accepting these 
benefits of development, with knowledge of both the ownership of the Ranch (through Iron 
Mountain Holding Group) and the development mechanism through MAI, Scott and Cathy have 
ratified the alleged conversion of MAI stock. 
43. Not only is there no evidence of concealment or other misleading conduct by the 
Defendants, the evidence is persuasive as to both Scott and Cathy that this is not a case where either 
of them should be relieved of their responsibility to be alert to their circumstances and assert their 
claims in a timely fashion. 
44. Scott and Cathy knew that shares of MAI were not distributed or issued in 
proportion to family members' interests in the 2700 acres of Ranch property, nor in proportion to 
their interests in the Option to Ground Lease. 
45. Scott and Cathy also knew that the shares of MAI were issued to representatives of 
the six families who contributed money for meeting the State Lease obligations in accordance with 
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theiSw»a4i^ agreemenLto use MAI as a mechanism to preserve that lease and develop the Ranch. 
46. The conversion of MAI stock occurred, if at all, no later than July 1, 1993 when 
Jackson and Rothwell's stock was received by the Lessors' Representative and new shares issued 
to Condas family members. Plaintiffs claim for conversion accrued at that time. Plaintiffs' 
complaint was not filed until June 19,1997, nearly four years later. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy of law with respect to the third and sixth claims 
for relief. 
2. With respect to breach of fiduciary duty and conversion claims against Lehmer and 
the conversion claim against MAI, the Plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence of damages and they 
expressly waived any damage claim during argument and by electing to proceed at trial solely in 
equity. 
3. No equitable remedy exists for the breach of fiduciary duty or conversion claims 
against Lehmer. The equitable remedy Plaintiffs desire is the "return" of their MAI stock, in the 
form of almost 22% of MAI as it exists today. While the case law supports Plaintiffs' argument 
that a corporation can be forced to issue shares to which they are found to be entitled, see West v. 
Tintic Standard Mining Co., 263 P. 490, 495 (Utah 1928), Plaintiffs did not assert a claim against 
MAI for breach of fiduciary duty. While Mr. Lehmer is a significant shareholder in MAI, he is 
not the corporation and MAI is not even alleged to have had a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiffs, 
let alone breached the duties that inhere in such a relationship. Therefore, while the Court could 
order MAI to issue stock to Plaintiffs, to order John Lehmer to give up his shares is to permit 
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Plaintiffs to receive a damages remedy without the necessity of proving their damages. 
4. The stock originally received from Jackson and Rothwell no longer exists. Lehmer 
does not possess any such shares and, therefore, the allegedly converted property cannot be returned. 
Because Lehmer does not possess the allegedly converted property, return of the stock by Lehmer 
as an equitable remedy is not available to the Plaintiffs. 
5. The Court cannot identify an equitable remedy that may be enforced against Lehmer 
and the Plaintiffs were unable to point the Court to any equitable remedy. Because Plaintiffs have 
waived any claim to damages and no equitable remedy is available with respect to their claims 
against Lehmer, Plaintiffs' claims against Lehmer fail for lack of a remedy. 
6. As against both Defendants, Plaintiffs conversion claims are governed by a three year 
statute of limitations found at §78-12-26(2) Utah Code Ann. The statute does not mandate the 
application of the "discovery rule" to the accrual to Plaintiffs' conversion claim. Whether or not the 
discovery rule applies is a question of law. See, Horn v. Utah Dept. of Public Safety, 962 P.2d 95, 
101 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Plaintiffs presented no evidence against either Defendant to show 
fraudulent concealment or any other wrongdoing that would invoke the Court's power to apply a 
discovery rule to delay the accrual of Plaintiffs' cause of action for conversion. 
7. Plaintiffs became aware, or reasonably should have become aware, of the possibility 
of a claim for conversion before expiration of the three-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, 
the conversion claim is barred by the statute of limitations. 
8. Even if the Plaintiffs' conversion claim against the Defendants was not barred by the 
statute of limitations, the claim is barred by the doctrine of ratification. The defendants' established 
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by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiffs ratified any conversion of IMAI stock. 
9. By accepting the benefits of development of the Ranch with prior knowledge of the 
development process, the ownership of the Ranch and the IMAI stock, Scott and Cathy ratified the 
actions of the Defendants. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the^J aay of February, 2003,1 caused to be hand-delivered a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the 
following: 
Craig G. Adamson 
Eric P. Lee 
Craig A. Hoggan 
Dart, Adamson & Donovan 
370 East South Temple, #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Michael S. Johnson 
350 South 400 East, Suite 101A 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Matthew L. Lalli, Esq. 
SNELL & WILMER 
15 West South Temple Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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TRUST AGREEMENT 
THIS TRUST AGREEMENT made on the 29th day of December, 
1976, between ALEXANDRA OCKEY, hereinafter called "the Grantor", 
and NICK J. CONDAS, hereinafter called "the Trustee". 
1. Trust Property. The Grantor, desiring to create 
trusts for the benefit of her children, hereby irrevocably 
assigns to the Trustee the property described in Schedule "A" 
attached hereto and made a part hereof, hereinafter termed 
"the trust estate" in trust for the purposes and on the con-
ditions hereinafter set forth. 
2. Depositive Provisions. The Trustee shall divide 
the trust property equally into two (2) separate trusts, one 
of such trusts to be held for the primary benefit of Scott John 
Ockey, and to be known as "The Scott John Ockey Trust" and one 
of such trusts to be held for the primary benefit of Ellen 
Ockey, and to be known as "The Ellen Ockey Trust". The 
Trustee shall hold, manage, and invest for trust purposes, and 
shall collect and receive the income thereof, and after deducting 
all necessary expenses incident to the administration of the 
trusts, shall dispose of the principal and income of the trusts 
as follows: 
a. The Trustee may distribute to, or apply for the 
benefit of, each primary beneficiary until he or she attains 
the age of twenty-one years, so much of the income, at such time 
or times and in such amounts and manner, as the Trustee, in his 
sole discretion, shall determine. Any amount which the Trustee 
shall determine not to use may be accumulated as income or may 
be added to the principal, as the Trustee shall deem best. 
b. As each primary beneficiary attains the 
age of twenty-one years, this Trust shall terminate as to such 
beneficiary, and the entire trust property then remaining shall 
be paid over and distributed to him or her, free and discharged 
of all trust. 
c. Notwithstanding the provisions of the immediately 
preceding paragraph, if within thirty (30) days after he or she 
attains the age of twenty-one years, any primary beneficiary 
shall, in writing, request the Trustee to do so, the Trustee 
shall continue the Trust until he or she attains the age of 
twenty-eight years. In such event, the trust income earned 
after such primary beneficiary attains the age of twenty-one 
years shall be paid to him or her in quarter-annual or other 
convenient intervals, in the discretion of the Trustee, and 
when such primary beneficiary attains the age of twenty-eight 
years, this trust shall terminate and the entire trust property 
then remaining shall be paid over and distributed to him or her, 
free and discharged of all trust. 
d. Should any primary beneficiary die before 
attaining the age of twenty-one years (or the age of twenty-
eight years, if this trust is extended pursuant to the provisions 
of sub-paragraph c of this paragraph), this Trust shall terminate, 
and the entire trust property then remaining shall be paid over 
and distributed to such persons, in such shares, and in such 
manner as such primary beneficiary may appoint by his last Will, 
provided this power of appointment is specifically referred to 
by the terms of such Will. 
e. Should any primary beneficiary die before 
attaining the age of twenty-one years (or the age of twenty-
eight years, if this Trust is extended pursuant to the provisions 
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of sub-paragraph c of this paragraph) and without validly 
exercising the general testamentary power of appointment 
referred to in sub-paragraph d in this paragraph, the Trustee 
shall pay over and distribute the entire trust property then 
remaining to the then surviving issue of the Grantor in equal 
shares upon the principle of representation, or, if there is 
no such issue of the Grantor then surviving, to the person or 
persons who shall be appointed to administer the estate of such 
primary beneficiary to be disposed of as a part of such estate. 
f. Notwithstanding anything hereinabove contained 
to the contrary, if at any time while the trusts herein created 
are in force any financial emergency arises in the affairs of 
any of the primary beneficiaries of such trusts, or if the 
independent income of any such beneficiaries (exclusive of the 
income from any trust herein or otherwise created for his 
benefit by the Grantor) and all other means of support are 
insufficient for the support of such beneficiary, in the judgment 
of the Trustee, the Trustee shall pay over to such beneficiary 
out of the corpus of the trust for his benefit, at any time 
and from time to time, such sum or sums as the Trustee shall 
deem necessary or appropriate in his discretion. 
3. Distributions to Minors. Any distribution of principal 
or income, made to any person, at such time as such person is 
under the age of twenty-one (21) years, may be made by and in 
the sole and exclusive discretion of the Trustee, either to the 
beneficiary, to some third party for the benefit of such 
beneficiary, or applied for the benefit of such beneficiary and 
such distributions made in good faith shall constitute the 
acquittance of the Trustee to the extent thereof. 
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4. Powers of Trustee. In the administration of the 
trusts, the Trustee shall have the following powers, all of 
which shall be exercised in a fiduciary capacity, primarily in 
the interest of the beneficiaries: 
a. To sell, transfer, lease for terms within or 
beyond the term of the trusts and for any purpose partition, 
subdivide, improve, repair, alter, mortgage, exchange and/or 
encumber all or any portion of the trust in any manner and on 
any terms which the Trustee shall, in his absolute discretion, 
deem to be for the best interests of the trusts and the 
beneficiaries thereof. 
b. To receive and to collect all proceeds, rents, 
income and accruals of every kind inuring to the benefit of 
the trust. 
c. To invest the trust estate in any property, real, 
personal or mixed, in which any individual may invest his own 
funds. In making investments the Trustee shall exercise the 
judgment and care in the selection of securities for purchase 
or acquisition which men of prudence, discretion and intelligence 
exercise, not in regard to speculation but in regard to the per-
manent disposition of their funds, considering the probable 
income as well as the probable safety of the capital. Notwith-
standing anything to the contrary herein contained, the Trustee 
is expressly authorized to enter into partnerships, whether 
general or limited, in his discretion. 
d. To deal with any indebtedness, liability or 
obligation due to or from the trusts which may at any time 
exist, and in connection therewith, the Trustee may make 
extensions, compromises, or other agreements relative thereto 
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as the Trustee may deem proper. 
e. To execute or enter into contracts, deeds, 
agreements, or any other documents of any nature whatsoever 
which the Trustee may deem necessary or desirable to carry out 
the provisions and the purposes of the trusts. 
f. To retain, either permanently or temporarily, 
any property, business investments or securities of any nature 
of the trusts without liability to said Trustee for any loss 
ensuing thereto by reason of such retention. 
g. To deal with any stock, stock rights, options, 
partnership interests, exchanges of stocks, notes and bonds, or 
securities of any other nature, or rights with reference thereto, 
which may come into the Trustee's possession or control as a 
part of the trust, with full power to vote the said stocks, 
either personally or by proxy, and with full power to subscribe 
or waive any stock rights and join in any refinancing, merger, 
reorganization, or consolidation of any company or business in 
which the trusts may own an interest and to register any 
securities held by the trusts in the name of a nominee without 
disclosing the fiduciary relationship. 
h. Anything to the contrary herein contained, to 
operate either solely or in conjunction with others any business 
operation or enterprise of any nature, whether it be an individual 
business, general or limited partnership or corporation, for as 
long a time and in such a manner as the Trustee deems proper 
for the best interest of the trusts, with full power to 
organize and/or operate as a sole proprietorship or partnership; 
to incorporate such business or to execute or join in any plan 
of refinancing, merger, consolidation or reorganization thereof, 
with full power to borrow such monies as the Trustee may deem 
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advisable for the purposes thereof, without liability for any 
losses incurred therein except those arising from bad faith or 
negligence. 
i. To borrow money for the benefit of the trusts 
at the then prevailing interest rates and to mortgage or en-
cumber any part or all of the property of the trusts as security 
for said loan or loans. 
j . To pay from the income of the trust the 
expenses of administrating the same such as taxes, insurance, 
upkeep and any and all items of expense ordinarily necessary 
to the operation of trusts of this character, including any 
fees and court costs necessarily incurred in enforcing any of 
the property rights pertaining to the property of the trusts. 
k. To make ordinary repairs and such extraordinary 
alterations in buildings or other structures as may be necessary 
to make the property productive. 
1. To effect and keep in force, life, fire, rent, 
title, liability, or casualty insurance, or other insurance of 
any nature, in any form and in any amount. 
m. To employ accountants, agents, attorneys, 
brokers, and others reasonably necessary in the administration 
of the trust estate, and to delegate to such persons any dis-
cretion which the Trustee may deem proper, and if such delegation 
is reasonable and the Trustee otherwise acts in good faith upon 
advice, counsel or information received thereby, the Trustee 
shall be relieved of any liability for having acted in 
accordance therewith. 
n. To have a lien and reimburse himself with 
interest or pay or discharge out of the trust estate, from either 
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principal or income, or from both, all advances made for the 
benefit or protection of the trusts or their properties, and 
all expenses, losses, liabilities not resulting from the 
negligence or the fault of the Trustee incurred in or about 
the execution or protection of the trusts or because of the 
Trustee's holding or ownership of any property subject thereto. 
o. To charge to operating expenses all current 
costs of amortization, obsolescence and depreciation of any 
properties of the trusts and to provide adequate reserves for 
such amortization, obsolescence and depreciation. 
p. The Trustee shall not be liable for mistakes 
of fact prior to the actual knowledge or written notice of such 
fact when the happening of any event, including attainment of 
a certain age, performance of certain requirements, death or 
any other event, affects distribution of income or principal 
of the trust estates. 
q. In any case in which the Trustee is required 
to divide the principal of any trust estate into parts or 
shares or to distribute the same, the Trustee is authorized 
and empowered in the Trustee's sole discretion, to make division 
or distribution in kind, or partly in kind and partly in money, 
or by granting, transferring or assigning an undivided interest. 
The judgment of the Trustee concerning the valuation for the 
purpose of such division or distribution of the property or 
security shall be binding and conclusive on all parties interested 
therein. In the event the Trustee shall determine to distribute 
to any beneficiary an undivided interest or share in any of 
said trust properties, then such beneficiary shall not have the 
right, without the Trustee's written consent, to partition, 
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until the termination of the trust created herein. 
r. The powers, duties and responsibilities stated 
herein shall not be deemed to exclude other implied powers, 
duties or responsibilities not inconsistent herewith, and any 
successor Trustee shall succeed to the same rights, powers, 
duties and responsibilities provided herein as the Trustee 
hereinbefore named. 
5. Principal and Income. The Trustee shall have the 
power to determine the allocation of the receipts between corpus 
and income and to apportion extraordinary and share dividends 
between corpus and income, provided such allocation or appor-
tionment is not inconsistent with the beneficial enjoyment of 
trust property accorded to a life tenant or remainderman under 
the general principles of the law of trusts, and provided that 
all rights to subscribe to new or additional shares or securities 
and all liquidating dividends shall be deemed to be corpus. 
6. Trustee's Authority and Third Parties. No person 
purchasing, renting, or leasing any of the property of the 
trusts, or in any manner dealing with the trusts or with the 
Trustee, shall be required to inquire into the authority of the 
Trustee to enter into any transaction, or to account for the 
application of any monies paid to the Trustee on any account. 
7. Additional Property. The Grantor reserves the 
right to herself or to any other person at any time, by deed or 
will, to add to the corpus of any or all of the trusts herein 
created, and any property so added shall be held, administered 
and distributed as part of such trust or trusts. Such additional 
property shall be allocated between the trusts in accordance with 
any directions given in the instrument of transfer. 
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8. Spendthrift Provision. No beneficiary of this 
Trust shal l have any right to alienate, encumber, or hypothecate 
his or her i n t e r e s t in the capital or interim of the trust estate 
in any manner, nor shall such interest of any beneficiary be 
subject to claims of his or her creditors or be l iab le to 
attachment, execution, or other process of law. 
9. Accounting by Trustee. The Trustee may render an 
accounting at any time (but not less often than annually) to 
the primary beneficiary of any or a l l of the trusts created herein, 
and the written approval of a primary beneficiary shall be final, 
binding, and conclusive upon a l l persons then or thereafter 
interested in the trust for that beneficiary. The Trustee may 
at any time render a judicial account of his proceedings for 
any or a l l of the trusts . 
10. Compensation of Trustee. The Trustee shal l be 
ent i t led to receive reasonable compensation for his services 
hereunder commensurate with the services rendered and the 
re spons ib i l i t i e s assumed by him. 
11 . Successor Trustee. In the event of the death, 
resignation, or incapacity of the original Trustee, Chris J. 
Condas, brother of the original Trustee, sha l l be the successor 
Trustee but i f he shall be unable, for any reason, to serve as 
Trustee or ceases to act as such, then George J . Condas, also 
brother of original Trustee, as appointed successor Trustee. 
Every successor trustee shall have the same duties and powers, 
as are conferred and assumed by this Agreement upon Nick J. 
Condas as Trustee. No successor Trustee sha l l be personally 
l iab le for any act or omission of any predecessor trustee. 
Any successor Trustee(s) may accept without examination or 
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review, the accounts rendered and the property delivered by 
or for a predecessor Trustee, without incurring any liability 
or responsibility for so doing. 
12. Bond. No Trustee shall be required to furnish any 
bond or securities for performance of his duties hereunder. 
13. Irrevocability. The Trusts shall be irrevocable, 
and the Grantor hereby expressly waives all rights and powers, 
whether alone or in conjunction with others, and regardless of 
when or from what source he may heretofore or hereafter have 
acquired such rights or powers, to alter, amend, revoke or 
terminate the trusts, or any of them, or any of the terms of 
this Agreement, in whole or in part. To more fully express 
his intentions, the Grantor hereby declares that he relinquishes 
absolutely and forever all his possession or enjoyment of, or 
right to the income from, the trust estate and all his right 
and power, whether alone or in conjunction with others, to 
designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the trust 
estate, or income therefrom. 
14- Situs. This trust has been executed and delivered 
in the State of Utah and shall be construed and administered 
according to the laws of that State. 
15. Interpretation. In construing this Agreement, 
masculine or neutral pronouns shall be substituted for those 
feminine in form and vice versa, and plural terms shall be 
substituted for singular and singular for plural in any place 
in which the context so requires. 
16* Headings. The headings contained in this instrument 
are for the purposes of reference only, and are not a part of the 
within instrument, and no inference or construction of this 
instrument shall be made by reason of said headings. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantor and the Trustee have 
executed this Agreement on the date and year aforesaid. 
ALEXANDRA OOCEY, Grantor 
NlfeK/J. CONDA& Trustee 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Utah ) ss. 
On the 2f &> jday of /•6*s % j , 191/p, personally 
appeared before me Alexandra Ockey, as Grantor, and Nick J. 
Condas, as Trustee, the signers of the foregoing instrument, 
who duly acknowledged to me that they executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires; 
? - / - ? ? 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
1. An undivided 1/6 interest in and to the following descr ibed 
real property in Summit County, Utah, to-wit: 
T2S R3E, SLB&cM: Lots 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14; West 1/2 SE 1/4; SW 1/4, 
of Section 1. Al l of Sect ion 11. Lots 1, 2 and 3; NW 1/4; W 1/2 of NE 1/4 . 
of Section 12. Lots I, 2, 3 and 4; W 1/2 E 1/2; SE 1/4 NW 1/4 , of Section 13. 
SE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Sect ion 14. East 1/2 of Section 24. 
T2S R4E; SLB&M: Lot 15 of Section 17. NW 1/4 of NE 1/4; Lots 15, 16, 21 . 
24, 25, 28, 29, 30 and 31 of Section 7. Lots 15, 16 and 19 of Section 18. 
Lots 6, 7, 8 and 9 of Section. 6. 
Dated the**)'*?' day of December, 1976. 
&l &¥(tn Xut_ k)cJkjux 
Grantor 
TRUST AGREEMENT 
THIS TRUST AGREEMENT made on the '?*Qj~ day of 
December, 1976, between NICK J. CONDAS, hereinafter called "the 
Grantor//, and MARY LEHMER, hereinafter called "the Trustee". 
1. Trust Property. The Grantor, desiring to create 
trusts for the benefit of his grandchildren, hereby irrevocably 
assigns to the Trustee the property described in Schedulef,A" 
attached hereto and made a part hereof, hereinafter termed "the 
trust estate" in trust for the purposes and on the conditions here-
inafter set forth. 
2. Dispositive Provisions. The Trustee shall divide 
the trust property equally into two (2) separate trusts, one of 
such trusts to be held for the primary benefit of SCOTT JOHN OCKEY, 
and to be known as "The Scott John Ockey Trust" and one of such 
trusts to be held for the primary benefit of JOHN C. CONDAS, and to 
be known as "The John C. Condas Trust". The Trustee shall hold, 
manage, and invest for trust purposes, and shall collect and receive 
the income thereof, and after deducting all necessary expenses 
incident to the administration of the trusts, shall dispose of 
the principal and income of the trusts as follows: 
a. The Trustee may distribute to, or apply for 
the benefit of, each primary beneficiary until he attains the 
age of twnety-one years, so much of the income, at such time 
or times and in such amounts and manner, as the Trustee, in his 
sole discretion, shall determine. Any amount which the Trustee 
shall determine not to use "may be accumulated as income or may 
be added to the principal, as the Trustee shall deem best. 
b. As each primary beneficiary attains the 
age of twenty-one years, this Trust shall terminate as to such 
beneficiary, and the entire trust property then remaining shall 
be paid over and distributed to him, free and discharged of all 
trusts. 
c. Notwithstanding the provisions of the 
immediately preceding paragraph, if within thirty (30) days 
after he attains the age of twenty-one years, any primary 
beneficiary shall, in writing, request the Trustee to do so, 
the Trustee shall continue the Trust until he or she attains 
the age of twenty-eight years. In such event, the trust income 
earned after such primary beneficiary attains the age of twenty-
one years shall be paid to him in quarter-annual or other 
convenient intervals, and when such primary beneficiary attains 
the age of twenty-eight years, this trust shall terminate and 
the entire trust property then remaining shall be paid over and 
distributed to him, free and discharged of all trusts. 
d. btiouid any primary be"heficiary die before 
attaining the age of twenty-one years, (or the age of twenty-
eight years,, if this trust is extended pursuant to the provisio 
of sub-paragraph b of this paragraph), this Trust shall terminate, 
and the entire trust property then remaining shall I?e paid over 
and distributed to such persons, in such shares, and in such 
manner as such primary beneficiary may appoint by his last Will, 
provided this power of appointment is specifically referred to 
by the terms of such Will. 
e. Should any primary beneficiary die before 
attaining the age of twenty-one years tor the age of twenty-eighl 
years, if this Trust is/ extended pursuant to the provisions of 
sub-paragraph c of this paragraph) and without validly exercising 
the general testamentary power of appointment referred to in 
sub-paragraph d in this paragraph, the Trustee shall pay over 
and distribute the entire trust property then remaining to the 
then surviving issue of the Grantor in equal shares upon the 
principle of representation, or, if there is no such issue of 
the Grantor then surviving, to the person or persons who shall 
be appointed to administer the estate of such primary beneficiary 
to be disposed of as a part of such estate, 
f. Notwithstanding anything hereinabove contained 
to the contrary, if at any time while the trusts herein created 
are in force any financial emergency arises in the affairs of 
any of the primary beneficiaries of such trusts, or if the 
independent income of any such beneficiaries (exclusive of the 
income from any trust herein or othpr«i«se created for his 
benefit by the Grantor) and all ocner means of support are in-
sufficient for the support of such beneficiary, in the judgment 
of the Trustee, the Trustee shall pay over to such beneficiary 
out'of the~"corpus of the" trust for his benefit, at any time 
and from time to time, such sum or sums as the Trustee shall 
deem necessary or appropriate in his discretion, 
3, Distributions to Minors. Any dn <5f*ribution of 
principal or income, made to any person, at such time as such 
person is under the age of ".wentv-one (21) years, may be made 
by and in the sole and exclusive discretion of the Trustee, 
either to the beneficiary, to some third party for the benefit 
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of such beneficiary, or applied for the benefit of such 
beneficiary and such distributions made in good faith shall 
constitute the acquittance of the Trustee to the extent thereof. 
4. Powers of Trustee^, - In the administration .of the. 
trusts, the Trustee shall have the following powers; all of 
which shall be exercised in a fiduciary capacity, primarily in 
the interest of the beneficiaries: 
a. To sell, transfer, lease for terms within or 
bevond the term of the trusts and for any purpose partition, 
subdivide, improve, repair, aicer, mortgage, exchange and/or 
encumber all or any portion of the trust in any manner and on 
any terms which the Trustee shall, in her absolute discretion, 
cfeera to be for the best interests of the trusts and the 
beneficiaries thereof. 
b. To receive and to collect all proceeds, 
rents, income and accruals of every kind inuring to the. benefit 
of the trust. 
c. To invest the trust estate in any property, 
real, personal or. mixed,. in_which any individual may invest his 
own funds. In making investments the Trustee shall exercise the 
judgment and care in the selection of securities for purchase 
or acquisition which men of prudence; discretion and intelligenc 
exercise, not in regard to speculation but in regard to the per-
manent disposition of their funds, considering the probable 
income as well as the probable safety of the capital. Notwith-
standing anything to the contrary herein contained, the Trustee 
is expressly authorized to enter into partnershiDs. whether-
general or limited, in her discretion. 
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d. To deal with any indebtedness, liability or 
obligation due to or from the trusts which may at any time 
exist and in connection therewith, the Trustee may make 
extensions, compromises, or other agreements relative thereto 
as the Trustee may deem proper. 
e. To execute or enter into contracts, deeds, 
agreements, or any other documents of any nature whatsoever 
which the Trustee may deem necessary or desirable to carry out 
the provisions and the purposes of the trusts. 
f. To retain, either permanently or temporarily, 
any property, business investments or securities of any nature 
of the trusts without liability to said Trustee for any loss 
ensuing thereto by reason of such retention. 
g. To deal with any stock, stock rights, options, 
partnership interests, exchanges of stocks, notes and bonds, or 
securities of any other nature, or rights with referpnce there-
to, which may come ""info the Trustee's ""possession or control ^s 
a part of the trust, with full power to vote the said stocks, 
either personally or by proxy, and with full power to subscribe 
or waive any stock rights and join in *any refinancing, merger, 
reorganization, or consolidation of any company or business in 
which the trusts may own an interest and to register any 
securities held by the trusts in the name of a nominee without 
disclosing the fiduciary relationship, 
h. Anything to the contrary herein contained, to 
operate either solely or in conjunction with others any business 
operation or enterprise of any nature, whether it be an individual 
business, general or limited partnership or corporation, for ats 
long a time and in such a manner as the Trustee deems proper 
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for the bes t i n t e r e s t of the t r u s t s , with f u l l power to 
organize and/or operate as a so le proprietorship or partnership; 
to incorporate such business or to execute or j o i n in any plan 
of re f inanc ing , merger, consol idat ion or reorganizat ion thereof, 
with f u l l power to borrow such monies as the i rus t ee may deem 
advisable for the purposes thereof, w i t h o u t - l i a b i l i t y for any 
lo s se s incurred therein except those ar i s ing from bad fa i th or 
negl igence. 
i . To borrow money for the bene f i t of the trusts 
at the then p r e v a i l i n g i n t e r e s t rates and to mortgage or en-
cumber any part or a l l of the property of the t r u s t s as security 
for said loan or loans . 
j . To pay from the income of the t r u s t the 
expenses of administrat ing the. same such as taxes , insurance, 
upkeep and any and a l l items of expense ordinar i ly necessary 
to nne operat ion of t r u s t s of this character, including any fees 
and^court c o s t s necessar i ly incurred in enforcing anv of the 
property r i g h t s pertaining to the property of the t r u s t s . 
k. Tn make ordinarv reDairs and such extraordina^ 
a l terat ions i n bui ldings or other structures as may be necessary 
to make the property productive. 
1 . To e f f ec t and keep in force , l i f t , f i re , rent, 
t i t l e , l i a b i l i t y , or casualty insurance, or other insurance of 
any nature, i n any form and in any amount. 
m. To employ accountants, agents , attorneys, 
brokers, and others reasonably necessary in the administration 
of the trust .f.2tate, and to delegate to such persons any d i s -
cret ion which the Trustee may deem proper, and i f such delegation 
i s reasonable and the Trustee otherwise acts in good faith upon 
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advice, counsel or information received thereby, the Trustee 
shall be relieved of any liability for having acted in accordant 
therewith. 
n. To have a lien and reimburse herself with 
interest or pay or discharge out of the trust estate, from either 
principal or income, or from both, all advances made for the 
benefit or protection of the trusts or their properties, and 
all expenses, losses, liabilities not resulting from cne negligen 
or the fault of the Trustee incurred in or about the execution 
or protection of the trusts or because of the Trustee's holding 
or ownership of any property subject thereto, 
o. To charge to operating expenses all currenc 
costs of amortization, obsolescence and depreciation of any 
properties of the trusts and to provide adequate reserves for 
such amortization, obsolescence and depreciation. 
p. The Trustee shall not be liable for mistakes 
of fact prior--to the actual knowledge or written notice of such 
fact when the happening of any event, including attainment of 
a certain age, performance of certain requirements, death or 
any other event, affects distribution of income or principal 
of the trust estates. 
q.-~ In any case in which the Trustee is required 
to divide the principal of any trust estate into parts or shares 
or to distribute the same, the Trustee is authorized and empowered 
in the Trustee's sole discretion, to make division or distribution 
in kind, or partly in kind and partly in money, or by granting, 
transferring or assigning an undividpd int-p-r^ ch TKP indonjenc 
of the Trustee concerning the valuation for the purpose of such 
division or distribution of the property or security shall be 
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binding and conclusive on all parties interested therein. In 
the event the Trustee shall determine to distribute to any 
beneficiary an undivided interest or share in any of said trust 
properties,'then-such-4jenefic-iary--shal-l-.^ot^-bave. the.right, .... 
without the Trustee's written consent, to partition, until the 
termination of the trust created herein. 
r. The powers, duties and responsibilities stated 
herein shall'not be deemed to exclude other implied powers, 
duties or responsibilities not inconsistent herewith, and any 
successor Trustee shall succeed to the same rights, powers, 
duties and responsibilities-provided herein as the Trustee 
hereinbefore named. 
4. Principal and Income; The Trustee shall have the 
power to determine the allocation of the receipts between corpus 
and income and to apportion extraordinary and share dividends 
between corpus and income, provided such allocation or apportion-
ment is not inconsistent with the beneficial enjoyment of trust 
property accorded to a life tenant or remainderman under the 
general principles - of the-law -of trusts'-, and orovided that-all 
rights to subscribe to new or additional shares or*'securities 
and all liquidating dividends shall be deemed to be corpus. 
5. . Trustee,s^Authority~,andjrhird Parties. "No person 
purchasing, renting, or leasing any of the property of the trusts, 
or in any manner dealing with the trusts or with the Trustee, 
shall be required to inquire into the authority of the Trustee 
to enter into any transaction, or to account for the application 
of any monies paid to the Trustee on any account. 
6. Additional Property. The Grantor reserves the 
right to himself-or to any- other-person-at-any-time, by deed or 
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wilj. to add to the corpus of amy or all of the trusts herein 
created, and any property so added shall be held, administered 
and distributed as part of such trust or trusts. Such additional 
property sball be allocated between tbe trusts in accordance wxlb 
any direction given in the instruemtn of transfer. 
7. Spendthrift Provision. No beneficiary of this 
Trust shall have any right to alienate, encumber, or hypothecate 
his or her interest in the capital or interim o£ the truste estate 
in any manner, nor shall such interest of any beneficiary be 
subject to claims of his creditors or be liable to attachment, 
execution, or other process of law. 
8. Accounting by Trustee. The Trustee may render an 
accounting at any time (but not less than annually) to the primary 
beneficiary of all or any of the trusts created herein, and the 
written .approval. of_a_pximary^enRfij:iary_shall-.be final,^binding 
and conclusive upon all persons then or thereafter interested in 
tbs txxist Sox tbat beneSiciaxy. Tne Ix-ustee may *^ *^n? V-OHE? 
render a judicial account of his proceedings for any or all of 
the-Trustsv-
9. Compensation of Trustee. The Trustee shall be 
entitled to receive reasonable compensation foiT her services 
hereunder commensurate with the services rendered and the 
responsibilities assumed by her. 
10. Successor Trustee. In the event of the death, 
resignation, or incapacity of the original Trustee, ELLEN BAYAS, 
sister of the original Trustee, shall be the successor Trustee, 
but if he shall be unable, for any reason, to serve as Trustee, 
ox ceases to act as such, then George J. Condas* Wis brother, 
is appointed successor Trustee. Every successor trustee shall 
have the same duties asxd. QQ^ers^ as are caaferre/i and assumed 
by this Agreement upon Mary Lehmer as Trustee. No successor 
Trustee shall be personally liable for any act or omission of any 
predecessor trustee. Any successor Trustee(s) may accept without 
examination or review, the accounts rendered and the property 
delivered by or for a predecessor Trustee, without incurring any 
liability or responsibility~for~so doing. 
11. Bond. No Trustee shall be required to furnish any 
bond or securities for performance of his duties hereunder. 
12. Irrevocability. The Trusts shall be irrevocable, 
and the Grantor hereby expressly waives all rights and powers, 
whether alone or in conjunction with others, and regardless of 
when or from what source he may heretofore or hereafter have 
acquired such rights or powers, to alter, amend, revoke or 
terminate the trusts, or any of them, or any of the terms of 
this Agreement, in whole or in part. To more fully express .. 
his intentions, the Grantor hereby declares that he relinquishes 
absolutely and forever all his possession or enjoyment of, or 
right to the income from, the trust estate and all his right 
and power, whether alone or in conjunction with others, to 
designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the trust estate, 
or income therefrom. 
13. Situs. This trust has been executed and delivered 
in the S_tate of Utah and shall be construed and administered 
according to the laws of that State. 
14. Interpretation. In construing my Will, masculine 
or neutral pronouns shall be substituted for those feminine in 
form and vice versa, and plural terms shall be substituted for 
singular and singular for plural in any place in which the con-
text so requires. 
15. Headings. The headings contained in this instrument 
are for the purposes of reference only, and are not a part of the 
within instrument, and no inference or construction of this 
instrument shall be made by reason of said headings. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantor and the Trustee 
A -M* Agreement on the date and year aforesaid, have executed this Agreement 
N I C K ^ C0NDA3, X^rantor 
MARY LEHMERJ, Trustee 
ss, 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
•o4^~day of December, 1976, personally 
On the if/-
appeared before me Nick J. Condas, as Grantor, and Mary Lehmer, 
as Trustee, the signers of the foregoing instrument, «ho duly 
acknovledged to me that they executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC . -
Residing at: Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
My Commission Expires: 
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
This Agreement is entered into this i ^ d a y of July, 1998, by and among SCOTT JOHN 
OCKEY (hereafter "Ockey"), OK INVESTMENTS, INC., a Utah corporation (hereinafter "OK"), 
IRON MOUNTAIN ASSOCIATES, L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company (hereafter "IMA"), 
WPA, LTD, a Utah limited partnership (hereafter "WPA") and WHITE PINE ASSOCIATES, INC, 
a Utah corporation (hereafter "WPA, Inc."). 
RECITALS 
A. The original members of IMA were Iron Mountain Holding Group. L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company (hereafter "IMHG"), Iron Mountain Alliance, Inc., a Utah corporation 
(hereafter "Alliance") and WPA, Inc. WPA has since been substituted as a member in place of 
WPA, Inc. WPA, Inc. is the general partner of WPA. 
B. IMA was formed to develop a rural residential subdivision project now known as The 
Colony at White Pine Canyon (hereafter the "Project") located in Summit County, Utah, on land 
which includes the real property described on Exhibit "A", attached hereto and incorporated herein 
by reference (hereafter the "IMHG Property"), and the real property' described on Exhibit "B", 
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference (hereafter the "Alliance Property"). 
C The operation of IMA is governed by the "Operating Agreement of Iron Mountain 
Associates. LLC, a Utah limited Liability Company", which was made and entered into as of 
September 14, 1995, was amended on November 2, 1996, and was restated and reaffirmed by 
resolutions of the members on July 11,1997, following the filing of Articles of Organization on July 
2,1997, copies of all of which are included in Exhibit "C\ attached hereto and incorporated herein 
by reference (hereafter collectively the "Operating Agreement"). 
D. Under the provisions of the Operating Agreement, WPA is the Manager and the 
Developer of the Project. 
E. Record title to the IMHG Property presently is vested in IMHG. Record title to the 
Alliance Property presently is vested in the State of Utah, School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration (hereafter "Trust Lands Administration"). Alliance presently is the Lessee of the 
Alliance Property with an option to purchase. The Operating Agreement provides that upon the 
discretionary approval of a subdivision map by the appropriate governmental agency, in this case the 
Summit County Board of County Commissioners, title to the IMHG Property shall be conveyed to 
IMA. Alliance and IMA are presently negotiating with the Trust Lands Administration for an 
amended lease with option to purchase relating to the Alliance Property. 
F. On June 25, 1997, Ockey and Catherine Condas (hereinafter "Condas") filed 
litigation in the Third Judicial District Court for Summit County, State of Utah, Civil No. 
970600081CV, Scott J. Ockey and Catherine Condas v. George Condas, et al (hereafter the 
"Litigation") in which Ockey and Condas asserted, as a portion of the Litigation, that conveyances 
of their real property interests into IMA, Ltd. (as defined below) by defendants Nick Condas, Ellen 
Bayas and Alexandra Ockey, and subsequently to IMHG, had been wrongful and were void ab initio. 
Consequently, Ockey and Condas further asserted in the Litigation claims of individual ownership 
interests in and to the IMHG Property. 
G, Ockey and Condas assert certain claims in the Litigation which seek to have title to 
an interest in the IMHG Property vested in them individually. The Project has progressed to a point 
where IMA believes those claims now threaten its ability to continue with the Project 
H. On February 25, 1998, a Verified Second Amended Complaint was filed in the 
Litigation, Ockey and Condas are not asserting any causes of action or claims against IMA, WPA, 
or WPA, Inc., and those entities are not parties to the Litigation. However, principals of and 
attorneys representing IMA, WPA and WPA, Inc. have represented to Ockey's and Condas5 counsel 
that they intend to intervene in the Litigation to protect their interests in the IMHG Property and to 
pursue claims for damages against Ockey and Condas. 
I. OK has acquired all of Ockey9 s right, title and interest in and to IMHG as well as the 
IMHG Property. 
X In order to allow the Project to go forward without further delay, the parties now desire 
to settle all claims between them on the terms and conditions set forth herein. 
TERMS OF AGREEMENT 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and promises set forth 
herein, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are 
hereby acknowledged, Ockey, OK, IMA, WPA and WPA, Inc. agree as follows: • 
1. Definitions. When the following terms and phrases are used in this Agreement, they 
shall mean and be defined as follows: 
1.1 "Agreement" shall mean this Settlement Agreement. 
1.2 "Alliance" shall mean Iron Mountain Alliance, Inc., a Utah corporation, a 
member of IMA and a defendant in the Litigation. 
1.3 "Alliance Property" shall mean the real property located in Summit County, 
Utah, which Alliance leases from the State of Utah, School and Institutional Trust Land 
Administration, and for which Alliance has an option to purchase, described on Exhibit "B" attached 
hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 
1.4 "Condas" shall mean Catherine Condas, a plaintiff in the Litigation. 
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1.5 "Developer," when referring to WP A, shall have the meaning set forth in the 
Operating Agreement. 
1.6 "Favorable Title Judgment" shall mean any final and unappealable Judgment 
under which Ockey and/or OK is found unconditionally to be vested with and/or entitled to become 
vested with equitable or legal title to any part or all of the IMHG Property, in his own right, and not 
as a partner of IMA, Ltd. or member of IMHG, and/or is found not to be required to participate in 
the Project under the Operating Agreement, regardless of the legal theoiy on which such Judgment 
is based. This definition includes any Judgment under the present First, Second and Third Causes 
of Action in the Second Amended Complaint in the Litigation, or under any other present, amended 
or additional causes of action which could affect title to the IMHG Property, This definition does 
not include any reference to the Alliance Property because Ockey is claiming a stockholder interest 
in Alliance, but does not make any claim to any individual title interest in the leasehold or any title 
to Alliance Property. 
1.7 "IMA" shall mean Iron Mountain Associates, L.L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, a part}7 to this Agreement and a former defendant in the Litigation. 
1.8 "IMA Defendants59 shall mean IMA, WPA, WPA, Inc., Walt Brett, Keith 
Kelley and Tom Gauld, all former defendants in the Litigation. 
1.9 "IMA, Ltd." means MA. Ltd, a Utah limited partnership which conveyed the 
IMHG Property to IMHG. 
L10 "IMHG9' shall mean Iron Mountain Holding Group, L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company, a defendant in the Litigation. 
1.11 "IMHG Property" shall mean the real property located in Summit County, 
Utah, which IMA will receive from IMHG under the terms of the Operating Agreement, described 
in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 
1.12 "Judgment" shall mean any final, unappealable judgment or order of the trial 
court or an appellate court in the Litigation. 
1.13 "Litigation" shall mean the litigation filed June 25,1997 in the Third Judicial 
District Court for Summit County, State of Utah, Civil No. 97060081CV, Scott J. Ockey and 
Catherine .Condas v. George Condas. et aj in its existing form as reflected by Plaintiffs' Second 
Amended Complaint, or as it subsequently may be modified by further amendments, counterclaims, 
cross-claims and/or third-party claims. 
1.14 "Manager', when referring to WPA, shall have the meaning set forth in the 
Operating Agreement. 
1.15 "Ockey" shall mean John Scott Ockey, a party to this agreement, and a 
plaintiff in the Litigation. 
LI6 "OK" shall mean OK Investments, Inc., a Utah corporation, a party to this 
Agreement 
LI7 "Operating Agreement" shall mean collectively the "Operating Agreement 
of Iron Mountain Associates, L.L.C., a Utah Limited Liability Company/' which was made and 
entered into on September 14, 1995, the amendment entered into on November 2, 1996, and the 
resolutions of the members of July 11, 1997, restating and reaffirming the September 14, 1995, 
document after the filing of Articles of Organization on July 2, 1997, collectively attached hereto 
as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by reference. 
1.18 "Project" shall mean the rural residential subdivision in Summit County, Utah 
now known as The Colony at White Pine Canyon. 
1.19 "Trust Lands Administration" shall mean the State of Utah, School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Administration, which is presently the lessor of the Alliance Property. 
1.20 "Unfavorable Title Judgment" shall mean any final and unappealable 
Judgment concerning title to all or any part of the IMHG Property which is not a Favorable Title 
Judgment, including, but not limited to, any Judgment which determines that the issues in the 
Litigation are, for any reason, not to be decided by the court. An Unfavorable Title Judgment may 
include, but is not limited to, any Judgment, regardless of the legal theory on which such Judgment 
is based, under which Ockey and OK are (a) found not to be vested and/or not entitled to become 
vested with any kind of title to any part or all of the IMHG Property, whether in Ockey's or OK's 
own individual capacity, or as a partner of IMA, Ltd., or as a member of IMHG; (b) found to be 
required to participate in the Project under the Operating Agreement; (c) found to be vested or to 
have been vested with any kind of title to any part or all of the IMHG Property, but the court declines 
to undo the prior conveyances to IMA, Ltd. and/or IMHG, and orders Ockey or OK to convey or 
holds that Ockey or OK is obligated to convey his title to IMA, Ltd., IMHG and/or IMA. This 
definition includes any Judgment under the present First, Second and Third Causes of Action in the 
Second Amended Complaint in the Litigation, or under any other present, amended or additional 
causes of action which could affect title to the IMHG Property. This definition does not include any 
reference to the Alliance Property7 because Ockey and Condas are claiming a stockholder interest in 
Alliance, but do not make any claim to any individual title interest in the leasehold or any title to 
Alliance Property. 
1.21 "WPA" shall mean WPA, Ltd., a Utah limited partnership, a party to this 
Agreement. 
1.22 "WPA Interest in Capital" shall mean the twenty-nine percent (29%) interest 
in capital of the Developer under the Operating Agreement. 
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1.23 "WPA, Inc." shall mean White Pine Associates, Inc., a Utah corporation, the 
general partner of WPA and a party to this Agreement. 
1.24 UWPA Management Fee" shall mean the One Percent (1%) interest in capital 
allocated to WPA for its services as Manager of IMA. 
2. Continuation of the Project. The central objective of this Agreement is to enable the 
Project to proceed forward without being impeded in any way by the Litigation, Although the 
Litigation may continue, as discussed in more detail below, it is the intent of the parties that IMA 
be able to continue with the Project as though the Litigation had not been filed and did not exist 
3* Development of the Project IMA and WPA shall be entitled to rely upon the terms 
and conditions set forth in the Operating Agreement in connection with the development of the 
Project, with WPA as the Manager and Developer. Ockey and OK each unconditionally waive any 
claims that any provision of the Operating Agreement which is not incompatible with the terms of 
this Agreement do not apply to all aspects of the development of the Project, including but not 
limited to, disbursements of money to the Members of IMA, payments to the Manager and 
Developer and all other economic, business and monetary provisions. Ockey and OK hereby waive 
(i) all claims and objections concerning the enforceability of the Operating 
Agreement arising out of the fact that the Articles of Organization of MA, filed July 2,1997, 
were filed after the date the Operating Agreement was signed; 
(ii) all claims that the Operating Agreement is not the agreement which governs 
the operations of IMA and the development of the Project (subject to specific payment 
provisions to Ockey and/or OK as set forth herein); 
Cm) all claims that WPA is not the Manager and Developer of IMA in place and 
instead of WPA, Inc.; and 
(iv) any and all objections to the Project as presently proposed by WPA and IMA, 
and as the Project may be modified from time to time by, and in the good faith business 
judgment of WPA and IMA. 
4. Continuation of the Litigation. Altei the execution of this Agreement and the 
originals of the companion agreements attached as exhibits hereto which require the signatures of 
any of the parties hereto, the Litigation shall be permitted to continue forward without any 
intervention or other voluntary involvement of any kind, direct or indirect, by EMA, WPA and WPA, 
Inc, subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement IMA, WPA and WPA, Inc. hereby 
unconditionally waive any right to intervene in the Litigation as defendants, counter-claimants, cross-
claimants, real parties in interest or in any other capacity, and agree not to participate in the 
Litigation in any way except as may be required by subpoena or order of the Court. IMA, WPA and 
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WPA, Inc. agree not to support or advise any party with respect to any aspect of the Litigation, or 
to provide any funding or other form of assistance of financial or other value to any party in 
connection with the Litigation, and shall refrain from any conduct which might serve to provide any 
incentive or disincentive to any party to undertake or forebear any action in or connected with the 
Litigation Avithout the prior written consent of Ockey. Nothing in this paragraph shall bar MA, 
WPA and WPA, Inc. from disclosing to any part}' to the Litigation any information pertinent to the 
Litigation on an informal basis, whether orally or in writing, provided that in the event of such an 
informal disclosure to any defendant, such information is simultaneously disclosed to Ockey and 
Condas. 
5. Agreement Regarding Title, Even though the Litigation may continue forward, 
Ockey and OK hereby agree that no result in the Litigation shall ever prevent IMA from acquiring 
fee simple title to Ockey's and OK's interests in the IMHG Property, and to vesting such interests 
in IMA to the same extent as would have occurred if the Litigation never had been filed and did not 
exist If Ockey and/or OK receives an Unfavorable Title Judgment, all disputes concerning title shall 
be ended, and neither Ockey nor OK shall have any individual claim to title, If Ockey and/or OK 
obtains a Favorable Title Judgment, OK agrees to sell to IMA all of its right, title and interest in and 
to the IMHG Property in accordance with the terms set forth in this Agreement and its Exhibits. 
Ockey and OK agree to deposit in escrow with High Country Title in Park City. Utah, a Quit Claim 
Deed to the IMHG Property conveying the same to MA, in the form attached hereto as Exhibit "D," 
incorporated herein by reference. Said Quit Claim Deed shall he placed in escrow at the time of the 
signing of this Agreement, and in the event Ockey or OK obtains a Favorable Title Judgment, the 
deed shall be released from escrow for recordation without further action of the parties in accordance 
with the tenns of the Escrow Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit "E~. Other than the signing of 
this Agreement and the Escrow Agreement, or the obtaining of a Favorable Title Judgment, no 
further action is required by Ockey* or OK to have this paragraph take effect, or to have the Quit 
Claim deed released and recorded in accordance with the terms of this Agreement and the Escrow 
Agreement. 
6, Future Conveyances by IMA and Title Insurance. Ockey and OK acknowledge and 
agree that IMA will go forward under this Agreement and convey title to lots and other parcels in 
the IMHG Property and the Alliance Property. Ockey and OKI acknowledge and agree that title 
insurance shall be provided to all third-party purchasers under all future conveyances made by IMA. 
Neither the deeds given by IMA nor the title insurance policies given to such third-party grantees-
shall show or make any exception for any interest of Ockey or OK in the IMHG Property or the 
Alliance Property. No claims which Ockey or OK have asserted or could assert concerning the title 
to the IMHG Property or the Alliance stockholder interest in the Alliance Property shall ever, in any 
way, cloud, interfere with, or be superior to the title of any of IMA's third-party purchasers of the 
IMHG Property and/or the Alliance Property and/or any part thereof 
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7. IMA's Agreement to Purchase OK*s Interests in IMHG Property in Event of a 
Favorable Title Judgment. In the event Ockey and/or OK obtain a Favorable Title Judgment, the 
parties agree that the Purchase and Sale Agreement between OK and IMA, attached hereto as Exhibit 
"F", shall immediately take effect, and title to OK's interests in the IMHG Property shall be 
conveyed to IMA in accordance with the Purchase and Sale Agreement and the Escrow Agreement 
? Development Agreement with ASC Utah. It is understood that IMA has executed a 
Development Agreement with ASC Utah (American Skiing) regarding the mutual development of 
the Property under which ASC is required to provide consideration to IMHG in the form of improved 
land and/or cash compensation. In addition to receiving their proportionate share of proceeds from 
the development of the Project as provided herein, Ockey, or OK as successor to Ockey, shall be 
entitled to receive, regardless of whether a Favorable Title Judgment or an Unfavorable Title 
Judgment is obtained, the same proportionate share of the proceeds from the development of the 
improved land and/or cash compensation under the agreement with ASC Utah which he or it would 
receive through IMHG if Ockey remained a member of IMHG in his or its present percentage of 
ownership. In the event of a Favorable Title Judgment, Ockey may wish to have a proposal 
submitted to ASC Utah for the Ockey/OK share of such proceeds to be paid in a different way than 
the others in IMHG. Ockey and OK acknowledge and agree that the negotiation of the terms of and 
the execution of the Development Agreement with ASC Utah resulted from a long, difficult and 
sensitive process which has significant economic impact on the development of the Project, and that 
under the terms of the Operating Agreement, WPA, as the Manager and Developer of the Project has 
the right to manage and control all important contractual relationships with parties involved in the 
Project including, but not limited to, ASC Utah. If a Favorable Title Judgment is obtained, and 
Ockey and/or OK desire to have such a proposal presented to ASC Utah, Ockey or OK shall first 
review the written proposal with IMA. Unless, in the good faith business judgment of IMA and 
WPA, presentation of such a proposal would be injurious to the other members of IMHG and/or 
IMA (in which case, the presentation will not be made), IMA, WPA and OK or Ockey will jointly 
make a good faith presentation of such a proposal to ASC Utah. Ockey,and OK agree not to make 
any such presentation on their own. If such a presentation is made to ASC Utah, and the results are 
not successful, or only partially successful, and not exactly what Ockey and/or OK wanted the result 
to be, failure to achieve the desired result shall not in any way constitute a breach of this Agreement 
^ Material Change of Circumstances. IMA and WPA hereby warrant and represent that 
they have fully disclosed to Ockey and OK the organizational structure, membership and operational 
agreements of MA as of the date of this Agreement, and agree that there shall be no changes to such 
organizational structure, membership or operations of IMA which would result in the diminution of 
the Full Purchase Price (as that term is defined in the Purchase and Sale Agreement) if such were 
to be calculated and paid given the current structure, composition and operations of IMA 
10. WPA Management Fee Not Affected. Nothing in this Agarim tit shall be construed 
as affecting payment of the WPA Management Fee in any way. 
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11* Favorable Title Judgment Shall Not Affect the WPA Interest in Capital Relating to 
the Alliance Property. In the event of a Favorable Title Judgment, Ockey agrees never to assert any 
claim that the twenty-nine percent (29%) interest in capital WPA is entitled to receive from IMA 
which relates to the Alliance Property is affected in any way by such Favorable Title Judgment. The 
only dollar amounts affected by a Favorable Title Judgment are those directly related to the IMHG 
Property. 
12. Powers of Attorney from Ockey. At the time of the execution of this Agreement, 
Ockey and OK shall execute irrevocable Special Powers of Attorney to WPA, in the form attached 
hereto as Exhibits "G" and "H" so that WPA can effectively proceed with the development of the 
Project, with appropriate authority to act for Ockey and/or OK- if needed. 
13. Waiver of Objections to Existing Contracts. Ockey and OK hereby acknowledge that 
they are aware of. and have had an opportunity to review personally and with their legal counsel, 
contracts with Park City, American Skiing Company and the Trust Lands Administration, attached 
hereto as Exhibits *T\ "T\ "K" and "L", respectively. Ockey and OK hereby waive any objections 
to each of said agreements. 
14. Acknowledgment of Authority for Future Contracts. Ockey and OK hereby 
unconditionally waive any claims that WPA, acting for IMA lacks any authority under the Operating 
Agreement and its Special Powers of Attorney to enter into other contracts relating to the 
development of the Project after the date of this Agreement and Ockey and OK agree that so long 
as said contracts are entered into under the terms of and pursuant to the provisions of the Operating 
Agreement they will not challenge or dispute said contracts. Ockey and OK are specifically aware 
of pending negotiations on an amended lease for the Alliance Property with the Trust Lands 
Administration, and they hereby unconditionally waive any claims that IMA lacks any authority to 
execute said amended lease. 
15. Releases of Notice of Interest. At the time of signing this Agreement, Ockey shall 
execute a Release of Notice of Interest in the forms attached hereto as Exhibit "M," and the Release 
of Notice of Interest will be-immediately recorded to remove the Notices of Interest from the record 
title of the IMHG Property and the Alliance Property. Ockey and OK each represent and warrant 
to IMA WPA and WPA, Inc., that as of the date of the execution of this Agreement, there is no other 
Notice of Interest, Lis Pendens or other document of record relating to any claim of title to the IMHG 
Property of record or the Alliance Property, and they each agree that after the signing of this 
Agreement, neither they nor anyone representing them or acting on their behalf will file any Notice 
of Interest Lis Pendens, or any other document asserting or relating to a claim of title to the IMHG 
Property or the Alliance Property. 
16. Settlement Letters to Summit County and To Whom It May Concern, and Agreement 
not to Interfere with Development Progress. At the time of signing this Agreement, Ockey and OK 
shall sign letters addressed to Summit County and To Whom It May Concern, in the form attached 
hereto as Exhibits "N" and "0" and incorporated herein by reference, to notify Summit County and 
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other concerned parties that a settlement has occurred among the parties to this Agreement which 
is intended to cause the Project to go forward, unimpeded and unaffected by the Litigation. Ockey 
and OK also agree, regardless of the progress of, any ruling or Judgment in, and/or the ultimate 
outcome of any issue in the Litigation, not to interfere in any way with the progress of the 
development of the Project after the signing of this Agreement Ockey and OK each agree not to 
make any derogatory statements to any person, entity or governmental commission, committee, 
agency, employee or officer concerning the IMA Defendants or the Project 
17. Release by Ockey and OK. Ockey and OK hereby luliy and completely release the 
IMA Defendants and their officers, directors, employees and agents of and from any and all claims, 
damages, liability and obligations of any and every description which were or could have been 
asserted in the Litigation, whether liquidated or unliquidated, known or unknown, past or present. 
This release shall not affect any obligation of the released parties under this Agreement. Ockey and 
OK expressly reserve all other claims they may have against any other person or entity in connection 
with the subject matter of the Litigation. 
1& Release by IMA Defendants. The IMA Defendants, and each of them, hereby fully 
and completely release Ockey and OK of and from any and all claims, damages, liability and 
obligations of any and every description which were or could have been asserted in the Litigation, 
whether liquidated or unliquidated, known or unknown, past or present. This release shall not affect 
any obligation of the released parties under this Agreement The IMA Defendants expressly reserve 
all other claims they may have as against any other person or entity in connection with the subject 
matter of the Litigation. 
19. Additional Obligation to Execute Documents and Cooperate, fhe parties hereto 
agree that each of them will execute such other documents as may in the future be determined in 
good faith by any other party hereto to be necessary for the implementation of the terms of this 
Agreement The parties agree to fully and completely cooperate with each other in good faith to take 
all reasonable steps needed to carry out the intents and purposes of this Agreement 
20. Condas Family Cabin. Ockey has been provided with a copy of the proposed 
subdivision plat map for Phase 1 of The Colony which shows the size and location of Lot 2, on 
which the historic Condas family cabin will be located in Phase 1. Ockey hereby waives any 
objection to the size and location of said Lot 2. The IMA Defendants acknowledge and agree that 
they have no ownership interest in or to Lot 2 or any of fhe proceeds of any sale, lease or other 
transaction involving Lot 2, either as a return on its investment in capital or as a portion of any fee 
payable under the Operating Agreement or any other agreement. The IMA Defendants agree to 
vacate the Condas family cabin within ninety (90) days after the effective date of this Agreement. 
21. Consent of Ockey to Restatement of Agreements in the Event of an Unfavorable 1 ltle 
Judgment In the Litigation, Ockey claims his participation in IMA, Ltd., and MHG was improperly 
obtained, and that conveyances of his interests into IMHG were void ab initio. Ockey may seek 
remedies in the Litigation which could result in the technical or actual dissolution of MA, Ltd., 
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MHG and/or IMA, or the reformation of the operative documents of such entities which would 
change or eliminate Ockey's participation therein. IMA and WPA intend to seek a separate 
agreement with all of the other partners of IMA, Ltd. and all the members of IMHG and M A for 
approval of this Agreement and providing that regardless of the outcome of the Litigation on the 
subjects discussed in this paragraph, MA, Ltd., MHG and M A shall remain legally viable entities, 
governed by their present operative documents (with the potential exclusion of Ockey therefrom), 
and particularly that the Operating Agreement of IMA shall continue to govern the affairs of IMA 
and that the Project shall continue to be developed on the terms and conditions set forth in the 
Operating Agreement. Ockey waives any objection to such action by IMA and WPA, and agrees not 
to interfere with such action in any way, now or in the future. This Agreement shall not be 
contingent upon the success of IMA and/or WPA in their efforts to obtain any such separate 
agreements or consents by the other partners of DMA, Ltd. or members of IMHG and MA, and shall 
be enforceable without regard thereto. 
22. Pro Formas - Disclaimer and Lack of Reliance. Prior to the execution of this 
Agreement, MA has provided Ockey and OK with approximate, generalized pro formas containing 
estimates of possible future economic results from the development of the Project through five 
phases of lot development and sales. Ockey and OK each acknowledge and agree that the pro formas 
are only rough, general estimates and approximations, and that actual future economic results may 
and undoubtedly will materially vary from the projections in the pro formas. M A does not warrant 
the accuracy or completeness of the pro formas, and specifically disclaims that they are accurate to 
any degree of certainty. Ockey and OK each agree and acknowledge that they have not relied on the 
pro formas in any way in making their decisions to enter into this Agreement, and that, instead, the}' 
have entered into this Agreement on the basis of their own investigation, knowledge and 
understanding of the Project, and their own estimates of the present and future value of the Project, 
and not on the pro formas. It shall not be a breach of any representation or warranty or any other 
provision of this Agreement if the estimates in the pro formas are materially different from the actual 
results of the development of the Project. M A has not provided the pro formas to Ockey and OK 
to induce them to enter into this Agreement, and Ockey and OK have not relied on them in entering 
into this Agreement. 
23. Pro Formas - Confidentiality. Ockey and OK each acknowledge and agree that the 
information contained in the pro formas provided to them by IMA prior to the execution of this 
Agreement is highly sensitive and confidential information, even though it consists of only rough, 
approximate and generalized estimates of future economic results of the development of the Project. 
Ockey and OK also acknowledge and agree that the disclosure of the pro formas or the information 
in them to anyone who is not a party to this Agreement or a party to the Litigation could cause 
serious harm to M A and IMHG. Ockey and OK each agree that they will keep the pro formas and 
the information in them confidential, and not disclose them to any person or entity other than parties 
to this Agreement or parties to the Litigation, or to Ockey and/or OK's attorneys, accountants and 
financial advisors (any disclosure to said professionals can only occur after they also agree to keep 
the pro formas and the information in them confidential and not disclose them to any other person 
or entity). 
10 
24. Liquidated Damages upon Disclosure of Confidential Information. If either Ockey or 
OK discloses the pro formas provided to them by IMA or any information in them, or any other 
confidential information concerning the operations of IMA or IMHG, to any person or entity other 
than their attorneys and accountants and parties to this Agreement or to the Litigation, Ockey and 
OK agree that, in addition to injunctive and other equitable relief available to IMA for such a breach 
of this Agreement, IMA shall be entitled to a liquidated damage award of $75,000 against Ockey and 
OK, jointly and severally for each such unauthorized disclosure. Liquidated damages are agreed to 
for such a breach of this Agreement because of the acknowledged harmfiil nature of such a 
disclosure, and the difficulty of determining the exact amount of actual damages from such a breach. 
25. Covenant Not to Sue. Ockey agrees that other than the possible continuation of the 
Litigation as agreed to herein and under the terms and conditions set forth herein, he shall not bring 
any future claims or join in, aid or abet any other person or entity in bringing any such claims, in 
litigation, administrative proceedings, arbitration, mediation or otherwise, which may in any way 
interfere with or delay the development of the Project or the implementation of all of the provisions 
of this Agreement. 
26. Intent of Waivers. With respect to the waivers set forth in paragraphs 3, 13. 14. 20 
and 21 and the Powers of Attorney executed hereunder it is the intention of OK and Ockey that such 
shall have no effect on any claims or defenses asserted by any party in the Litigation, and further that 
such shall create no third party beneficiary rights in any party to the Litigation. IMA, WPA and 
WPA, Inc. take no position with respect to the effects which any waivers or the Powers of Attorney 
hereunder may have on any rights or claims of any non-party to this Agreement, and hereby agree 
not to take any position in the future with respect to any effects which such may have on any rights, 
claims or defenses of any party to the Litigation. In any event, the effect of any such waivers shall 
have no bearing on the validity or enforceability of this Agreement and its companion agreements. 
27. Warranty7 of OK. OK hereby warrants and represents that it is a corporation duly 
organized, validly existing, and in good standing under the laws of the State of Utah. 
28. Notices. All notices required or permitted under the terms of this Agreement shall be 
deemed complete upon personal delivery, or upon deposit in first-class U.S. Mail with postage 
prepaid for certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed as follows: 
Notices to Ockey: 
c/o Todd D. Wakefield 
Wakefield & Wright 
Intermountain Center, Ste \I) J 
2029 Sidewinder Drive 
P.O. Box 682186 
Park City. Utah 84068-2186 
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Notices to OK Investments, Inc.: 
Notices to IMA: 
Scott J. Ockey 
c/o Todd D.Wakefield 
Wakefield & Wright 
Intermountain Center, Ste. 302 
2029 Sidewinder Drive 
P.O. Box 682186 
Park City, Utah 84068-2186 
Iron Mountain Associates, LLC 
2455 White Pine Canyon Road 
Park City, Utah 84060 
With copies to: 
Stephen G. Stoker 
Stoker & Swinton 
311 South State, Ste. 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Notices to WPA and/or WPA, Inc.: 
WPA, Ltd. and/or WPA, Inc. 
2455 White Pine Canyon Road 
Park City, Utah 84060 
With copies to: 
Stephen B. Doxey 
4625 South 2300 East, Ste. 206 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
The above notice addresses may be changed from time to time by the party to receive the 
notice, provided written notice to the other party, in the manner set forth herein, of a new or 
corrected address. 
29. Attornevs, Fees and Other Expenses and Costs upon Default If a default occurs 
in the performance of the obligations of any part}' to this Agreement, reasonable attorneys' fees, 
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expenses and costs incurred in arbitration and/or court proceedings pursued to enforce the terms 
of this Agreement shall be awarded to the prevailing party in said proceedings. 
30 Injunctive Relief Available in the Event of Default In addition to money damage 
and other breach of contract remedies any of the parties hereto may have, in the event of a default 
hereunder, the parties acknowledge that such remedies may not be sufficient protection of their 
interests, so they are also each granted the right to injunctive remedies hereunder, including but 
not limited to, remedies of temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunction and specific 
performance where appropriate. 
31. Authority. The parties represent and warrant that their performance hereunder and 
the transactions contemplated hereby have been duly authorized by all requisite actions. Each of 
the individuals signing on behalf of the parties represents and warrants that he has the requisite 
authority to execute this Agreement. 
32. Binding on Successors and Assigns. This Agreement, including all of its 
covenants, promises, obligations and agreements shall be binding on, and inure to the benefit of 
the successors and assigns of the parties hereto. 
33. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be interpreted and enforced according to 
the laws of the State of Utah. 
34. Final Agreement. Amendment. This Agreement sets forth the final agreement of 
the parties hereto concerning the subject matter of this Agreement. All prior negotiations, oral 
agreements and written agreement, if any, concerning the subject matter of this Agreement are 
superseded and replaced by this Agreement- This Agreement may not be amended except by a 
written instrument signed by all parties hereto. 
35. Iime of the Essence. Time Is of the essence In this Agreement. 
36. Recitals Incorporated in Agreement. The Recitals set forth at the beginning of 
this Agreement are intended to be true and correct statements of fact and material representations 
of the parties hereto, and said recitals are, therefore, incorporated into the Terms of Agreement 
set forth herein, and are an integral and material part of this Agreement. 
37. Counterpart Execution. This Agreement may be executed in an)7 number of 
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original and all of which shall constitute one 
agreement with the same effect as if all parties had signed the same signature page. Any 
signature page of this Agreement may be detached from any counterpart of this Agreement and 
reattached to any other counterpart of this Agreement identical in form hereto, but having 
attached to it one or more additional signature pages. 
— The Remainder of this Page is Intentionally Left Blank — 
13 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have signed this Agreement as of the date first 
above written with the intent to be legally bound by all of the terms and conditions set forth 
herein. 
OK INVESTMENTS, INC 
a Utah corporation 
Cathy Condas, President 
IRON MOUNTAIN ASSOCIATES, LLC, 
a Utah limited liability company, 
By; WPA, LTD. ~ Its Manager 
By: Wh^e'Pine Associates, Inc. -Jfe-General Partner 
Keith R. Kelley, Vice-President/Secretaiyy 
WPA. LTD, q, Utah limited partnership 
By: White Pure Associates, Inc. — Its Gfeneral Partner 
Keith R. Kelley, Vice-Pr^sident/Secretary 
WHITE PINE ASSOCIATES, INC., 
a Utah ooiporatior 
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POWER OF ATTORNEY 
STATE OF / y ^ T ^ C ) 
COUNTY OF j/ktfJjtMjL-.) 
I, $<?<9TT yoM^/ O^rttfy
 9 the principal, whose address is 
?. 0* fiox (flL H * £ Ctiy
 f U-V gM*c,d , designate John R. Lehmer as 
n A^OI^S R^roen'tative^ whose address is Post Office Box 626. Park City, Utah 84060 . as my 
true and lawful attorney-in-fact and agent to act for my use and benefit, in my name, place, and 
stead, and on my behalf, for the purpose of doing aU things necessary or permissible as described 
as follows: 
1, Grant of Power. To request, collect, and receive on my behalf all sums-owed or in 
future owing to me under that certain Option to Ground Lease and Ground Lease (the "Option") 
made and entered into between me, among others, as Grantor, and Iron Mountain Alliance, Inc., 
a Utah corporation, (the "Grantee"), granting to Grantee the Option to ground lease certain land 
in Summit County, Utah, a portion of which is owned by me and others as tenants in common for 
the development of a ski area and recreational resort The land of which I am a tenant in common 
owner and which is encumbered by the Option is described in Exhibit A hereto (the "Property"), 
along with a description of my present ownership interest No modification, addition, or withdrawal 
of any of the Property from the Option and no change in my ownership interest in the Property 
shall effect the validity of this Power of Attorney. I grant to Lessor's Representative the authority 
to act on my behalf in all matters requiring my consent, cooperation, or assistance under the 
Option, including, but not limited to, the bringing of suit to quiet title to the Property, Lessor's 
Representative is empowered to cause the drafting, execution, and delivery of all documents and 
instruments of any kinds whatsoever in order tci exercise any power I have granted to him under 
this Power of Attorney. I grant to the Lessor's Representative full power and authority to do 
everything necessary in exercising any of the powers herein granted as fully as I might or could do 
if personally present, with full power of substitution or revocation, hereby ratifying and confirming 
all that Lessor's Representative shall lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue of this Power of 
Attorney, This Power of Attorney shall be unaffected by any amendment to the Option entered 
into between Lessor's Representative, on my behalf, and Grantee or its successors or permitted 
assigns. 
2. Third-Party Reliance. Third parties may rely -upon the representations of Lessor's 
Representative as to all matters relating to any power I have granted to Lessor's Representative, 
and no person or institution acting in reliance upon the representation of Lessor's Representative 
or the authority herein grantee! to Lessor's Representative shall incur any liability to me or to my 
estate as a result of permitting Lessor's Representative to exercise any such power. 
3. Disability of Principal* This power of Attorney shall not be affected by my disability. 
The authority of Lessor's Representative is exercisable notwithstanding my later disability or 
incapacity or later uncertainty of whether I am dead or alive. All acts done by Lessor's 
Representative pursuant to this Power of Attorney during any period of my disability or 
incompetence, or uncertain as to whether I am dead or alive, shall have the same effect and inure 
to the benefit of an bind me as well as my heirs, devisees, personal representatives, and fiduciaries 
as if I were alive, competent, and not disabled 
4. Expiration of Power. This Power of Attorney shall be coupled with an interest and 
shall continue in full force and effect until all of the following conditions are met: (i) this Power 
of Attorney is revoked by me or my personal representative or fiduciary in writing and Grantee has 
received the original of such writing at the address provided for notice to Grantee in the Option; 
(ii) I or my personal representative or fiduciary has appointed a successor Lessor's Representative 
by execution and acknowledgment of a new power of attorney in the form of this Power of Attorney 
and such new power of attorney has been delivered to Grantee; (iii) my successor Lessor's 
Representative is the same person as appointed by all other tenant in common owners of the 
"Lehmer/Condas Parcels," as defined in the Grantee; and (iv) my appointment of a successor 
Lessor's Representative is in full compliance with the provisions of Section 2A.c of the Option. 
5. Photographic Copies, Any photographic copy of this power of attorney, shall have 
the force.and effect of the original. 
Dated: ^~2o-9^ 
STATE OF /s&X-
COUNTYOF JMJA^S ss. 
I, a Notary Public, hereby ce: 
personally appeared! before me w?^ 1992, sworn, declared 
that he is the person who signed the foregoing Pow< 
My Commission Expires: 
EXHIEjITA 
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POWER'OF ATTORNEY 
The Property Is comprised of the following parcels: 
1. The following parcels shall be known as the "Lehmer/Condas Parcels": 
PARCEL 1: 
All of lots 15,16, and 19 of Section 18, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
PARCEL 2: 
The Southeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 14. Township 2 South, Range 3 East 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 3: 
AH of Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4, and the West half of the East half, the Southeast Quarter of the 
Northwest Quarter of Section 13, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 4: 
All of lots 1,2, and 3, and the Northwest Quarter, and the West half of the Northeast Quarter of 
Section 12, Township'2 South Range 3 East Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCELS: 
All of Section 11, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt I .inn i.i.v.e ami Meridian. 
PARCEL 6: 
AH of Lots 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14, and the; Southwest Quarter, and the West half of the 
Southeast Quarter of Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Less approximately 30 Acres of Lot 9 surrounding the Historic, Family Cabin site, to be more 
accurately described prior to Closing, and ^ $'spring appurtenant thereto which provides water 
to the cabin site. 
PARCEL 7: 
Ail of Lots 1,10,11,12,13, and 14, of Section;1 ^ 4 jand the remainder o^  the East half of Section 
24, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Satj ijLdfie'gase and [ Meridian, ta the extent owned by 
Lessor. 
PARCEL 8: 
All of Lots 6, 7, 8, and 9 of Section 6, ToWfiship !2 South, Rariae 4 East Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
PARCEL 9: 
All of Lots 15, 16, 21, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30j||§na]3;i and thi Npfthwest Quarter of Section 7, 
Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Uk$ l6Mand Meridian: 
IHt 
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(Continued) 
PARCEL 10: 
The Northeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 7, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 11: 
The West Half of the Northwest Quarter of Section 8, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
EXCEPTING from PARCELS 10 and 11 above, the following described tracts of land: 
BEGINNING at a point on the SouthUne of Section 5, Towpshlp 2 South, Range 4 East, Sa.lt 
Lake Base and Meridian said Point being South 89 21 '00' West 1330.66 feet from the South 1 /4 
comer of said Section 5: thence South 555i07Jfeet; thence West 1020.00 feet; thence North 
543.49 feet to the South line of said Section ;5; thence alortq said section line North 89 21'00". 
East 1020.07 feet to the point of BEGINNING.; (Basis of bearings being the South line of Section 
4, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian which has a bearing of South 
89 49*21'West.) 
ALSO BEGINNING at a point West 5272.02 feet and South 506.93 feet from the Northeast comer 
of Section 8, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said pint being 
the Northeast comer of 110.00 feet X 110.00 feet water'tank site; thence South 1110.00 feet; 
thence West 110.00 feet; thence North 110.00 feet; thence East 110.00 feet to the point of 
BEGINNING. 
ALSO a parcel of land being 35.00 feet wide,117.50 feet right and 17.50 feet left of the following 
described line. BEGINNING at a description, West 55.00 feet from the Northeast corner of said 
description; thence North 41 09*25* East 122.35 feet; thence North feet; thence 2 29*57" East 
116.39 feet; thence North 43 23'52" East 193.7JI feet; thence North 33 16'48" East 120.30 feet 
more or less to a point on the North line of ^ald Section 8 and the South line of Lot 34 of, Iron 
Canyon Subdivision, said point being Soutty '8^ 21'00" West 5042.65 feet from the Northeast 
comer of said Section 8. (Basis of bearing jfojrjthe water tank site and the access road is the 
North line of Section 9, Township 2 South, Rapge 4 East, Salt' Lake Base and Meridian which 
has a bearing of North 89 49*28" East) 
PARCEL 12: 
Lot 15 of Section 17, Township 2 South, Raftge^ East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 13: 
A Non-exclusive Easement for access creat^Mahd contained In that certain Quit-Claim Deed 
of Easement recorded July 16,1981 as Entr|f NoJ 181898 |in Book M-193 at page 378 of the 
Official Records, over and across the followrj^ j^ efets of lanpl, tp-wtt: , 
Lot 4 and the Northwest Quarter of the SoMj^ist Quarter! of! Section 12, Township 2 South, 
Range 3 East,' Salt1 Lake Base and Meridian 
A£ : 
EXHIBIT A 
TO 
POWER OF ATTORNEY 
(Continued) 
The following part!- the parcels the 
comprise the Property: 
1. As to the Lehmer/Condas Parcels: 
PARCELS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,7,8, 9, and 12: 
JOHN R. LEHMER, also known as JOHN LEHMER, as to an undivided 4/18th interest; 
ELLEN C. BAYAS, as Successor Trustee of the SCOTT JOHN OCKEY TRUST and of the JOHN 
C. CONDAS TRUST, as to an undivided 2/18th interest; 
NICK J. CONDAS, as Trustee of the MARINA G. CONDAS TRUST, as to an undivided 1/6tfr 
interest* 
NICK J.' CONDAS, as Trustee of the HERMIONE P. BAYAS TRUST, as to an undivided 1/6th 
intorGSt" 
NICK J. CONDAS, as Trustee of the JOHN C. CONDAS TRUST and of the CATHERINE 
CONDAS TRUST, as to an undivided 1/6th interest; 
NICK J. CONDAS, as Trustee of the SCOTT JOHN OCKEY TRUST and of the ELLEN OCKEY 
TRUST, as to an undivided 1/6th interest; 
PARCELS 10 and 11.-
GEORGE J. CONDAS, as to an undivided 1/6th interest; 
NICK J. CONDAS, as to an undivided 1/6th interest; 
MARY C. LEHMER, as to an undivided t/fflh interest; 
ELLEN C. BAYAS, as to an undivided 1 /6th interest; 
CHRIS J. CONDAS, as to an undivided 1/6th interest; 
ALEXANDRA C. OCKEY, as to an undivided 1/6th interest; 
PARCEL 13: 
JOHN R. LEHMER, also known as JOHN LEHMER, ELLEN C. BAYAS, as Successor Trustee of 
the SCOTT JOHN OCKEY TRUST and of the JOHN C. CONDAS TRUST, NICK J. CONDAS, as 
Trustee to the MARINA G. CONDAS TRUST, NICK J. CONDAS, as Trustee of the HERMIONE 
P. BAYAS TRUST, NICK J. CONDAS as Trustee of the JOHN C. CONDAS TRUST and of the 
CATHERINE CONDAS TRUST, NICK J. CONDAS, as Trustee of the SCOTT JOHN OCKEY 
TRUST and of the ELLEN OCKEY TRUST, GEORGE J. CONDAS, NICK J. CONDAS, MARY C. 
LEHMER, ELLEN C. BAYAS, CHRIS J. CONDAS, ALEXANDRA C. OCKEY. 
ALL AS THEIR INTEREST MAY APPEAR. 
(Collectively, "Lehmer/Condas") 
A-3 
MINUTES OF SPECIAL MEETING OF THE SHAREHOLDER 
OF IRON MOUNTAIN ALLIANCE, I N C . 
DATED JULY 1 , 1 9 9 3 
,a1 m<,etincr of the shareholder of Iron Mountain 
• ? £ She "Company"), was convened to appoint the newly 
Alliance, Inc. (the J£»P*"J _'
 f t h e company. Notice of the meeting 
constituted Board of Directors of ^ Pf Y ^ s h a r e h o l d e r b e l o w > 
was waived as e J ^ e n ^ £J
 1 9 9 3 between the Company, Gerald A. 
By ^ ^ ^ / ^ ^ S r a n d John Lehmer, as Lessor's Representative, 
Jackson, H a n k *°5nw!rihr comnanv was delivered to Lehmer as a means of 
100% of the stock ^ **?<*"**^ e SmPany to the various members of 
transferring the ownership o f ^ P ^
 C o n d a S / a c t i n g a ^ 
the Condas family- C°n^mPJed the members of the Condas family to family^ccmmunicator contacted^the^ ^ ^ ^ ^
 a n d a c o u r s e Qf 
determine their d e f ^ e s J
 d b t o f t h e company and the expenses 
action for ^ e Pg»ent of the M
 Q f ^ ^ . ^ p ± n e C a n y o n / I r o n 
associated with the ongoing «e J^,
 d i r e c t i v e i s to constitute the 
Mountain prefect. ™ « JSJei (3) man board comprised of John Lehmer, 
Board °f D i r e^°Jf cf Condas and to use the Company as a mechanism to 
John Condas and Nick Co n aJ^
 d t h e deveiopment effort, 
1. The following persons are elected to be the Directors of 
the Company: 
John R. Lehmer 
John C. Condas 
Nick J- Condas. 
mu ^r^v certificates obtained from Iron Mountain 
2. The f - ^ * c l ^ t ^ l n and Hank Rothwell, specifically Alliance, Inc., G ^ d < 3 * ^ jackson for 411.5 shares, no. 2 to 
certificates no. 1 to Gerald A^ Jac ^ ^
 J a c k s Q n f o r 2 / 9 6 s . 5 2 1 
Hank Rothwell for 206 s h ^ s ^ i,479.97S-shares, are herewith 
shares and no. 4 to H w * Rothwell i ^ ^ ^ ^ Q n > 
delivered and transferred to the^ 
JL000791 
